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VALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

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In a large view of the matter valuation is nothing less than the selective process in the mental-social life of man: all values are in some sense survival values and have a bearing on the onward tendency of things. They indicate significance with reference to some sort of a crisis, and are factors in guiding the behavior of some sort of organism. The idea might easily be extended to lower forms of life and made to embrace all the psychical aspects of selection; we shall be content, however, to consider some of its human applications.

The manner in which a certain object develops value for a man in a particular situation is a matter of the commonest experience: at every instant we are passing from one situation to another and the objects about us are taking on new values accordingly. If I wish to drive a nail I look at everything within reach with reference to its hammer-value, and if the monkey-wrench has more of this than any other object available I reach for it, its function increases, it survives, it is the fit, is a growing factor in life. And men, nations, doctrines, what you will, wax and wane by analogous acts of selection.

The essential things in the conception of value are, then, a human organism (not necessarily a person) a situation and an object; the last having properties that have an influence on the behavior of the organism in view of the situation. The organism is, of course, the heart of the whole matter. We are interested primarily in that because it is a system of life, and in values because they mould its growth. The various values acting on the organism are ever being integrated by the latter (as by a man when he "makes up his mind") and the situation is met by an act of selection, which is a step in growth, leading on to new situations and values.

Valuation includes the history that lies back of values, that antecedent process of growth and struggle by which any object of thought or sentiment comes to have more or less power over choice and action. If, for example, diamonds, the paintings of Corot, the dogmas of Christian Science, the idea of brotherhood, the attainment of the South Pole, the services of a physician, have power, in various ways and degrees, over human behavior, it is because there has been a previous mental and social process out of which these objects have emerged with a certain weight for certain mental situations.

The organism which the idea of value implies, the life which is the heart of the process, about which values center may be personal or it may be impersonal: a doctrine, an institution, a movement, anything which lives and grows, gives rise to a special system of values having reference to that growth, and these values are real powers in life whether persons are aware of or interested in them or not; the growth of language, for example, of myth, of forms of art, works on to important issues with little or no conscious participation on our part. In general there are as many centers of value as there are phases of life.

The various classifications of value are based in one way or another on that of the objects, organisms or situations which the general idea of value involves. Thus, taking the point of view of the object, we speak of grain-values, stock-values, the values of books, of pictures, of doctrines, of men. Evidently, however, these are indeterminate unless we bring in the organism and the situation to define them. A book has various kinds of value, as literary and pecuniary, and these again may be different for different persons or groups.

As regards the forms of human life to which values are to be referred, it seems to me of primary importance to make a distinction which I will call that between human-nature values and institutional values.

The first are those which may be traced without great difficulty to phases of universal human nature. The organism for which they have weight is simply man in those comparatively permanent aspects which we are accustomed to speak of as human nature, and to contrast with the shifting institutions that are built upon it. The objects possessing such values differ greatly from age to age, but the tests which are applied to them are fundamentally much the same, because the organism from which they spring is much the same. A bright color, a harmonious sound, have a value for all men, and we may reckon all the more universal forms of beauty, those which

men of any age and culture may appreciate through merely becoming familiar with them, as human-nature values. Such values are as various as human nature itself and may be differentiated and classified in a hundred ways. There are some in which particular senses are the conspicuous factors, as auditory and gustatory values. Others spring from the social sentiments, like the values of social self-feeling which underlie conformity, and the values of love, fear, ambition, honor and loyalty. Closely related to these are the more universal religious and moral values, which, however, are usually entangled with institutional values of a more transient and special character. The same may be said of scientific, philosophical and ethical values, and great achievement in any of these fields depends mainly on the creation of values which are such for human nature, and not merely for some transient institutional point of view.

The second sort of values are those which must be ascribed to an institutional system of some sort. Human nature enters into them but is so transformed in its operation by the system that we regard the latter as their source, and are justified in doing so by the fact that social organisms have a growth and values that cannot, practically, be explained from the standpoint of general human nature. The distinction is obvious enough if we take a clear instance of it, like the distinction between religious and ecclesiastical values. Such general traits of religious psychology as are treated in William James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, correspond to values that we may call values of human nature; the values established in the Roman Catholic Church are a very different matter, though human nature certainly enters into them. In the same way there are special values for every sort of institutional development—legal values, political values, military values, university values, and so on. All technical values come under this head. Thus in every art there are not only human-nature values in the shape of phases of beauty open to men at large, but technical values, springing from the special history and methods of the art, which only the expert can appreciate.

Pecuniary values should, I think, be reckoned in this second class, for reasons which I shall not attempt to give at present.

This distinction, as I have remarked, rests upon the fact that there are forms of social life having a distinct organic growth, involving distinct needs and values, which cannot be understood by direct reference to universal human nature and the conditions that immediately influence it. I am aware that it may be difficult to apply to particular cases. It resembles most psychological distinctions in

offering no sharp dividing line, being simply a question of the amount and definiteness of social tradition and structure involved. All human values are more or less mediated by transient social conditions: they might, perhaps, be arranged in a scale as to the degree in which they are so mediated; some, like the taste for salt, comparatively little, others, like the taste for poetry, a great deal. In dealing with the latter kind we come to a point on the scale where the social antecedents take on such definite form and development as to constitute a distinct organism which must be studied as such before we can understand the value situation. In moral values, for example, there are some, like those of loyalty, kindness and courage, which spring quite directly from universal conditions and may be regarded as human-nature values; others, like the obligation to go to church on Sunday, are evidently institutional. I need hardly add that human and institutional values often conflict, or that reform consists largely in readjusting them to each other. Nor need I discuss in detail the familiar process by which human-nature values, seeking realization through a complex social system, are led to take on organization and an institutional character which carries them far away from human-nature and in time calls for a reassertion of the latter; or just how this reassertion takes place on the initiative of individuals and small groups. Any one may see such cycles in the history of the Christian church, or of any other institution he may prefer to study.

It is noteworthy, also, that there are words that may be understood in either a human-nature or an institutional sense, and so are ambiguous with reference to this distinction. For example educational value might be a real human value, or it might refer to tests of a special and technical sort, and "religious" often means ecclesiastical.

The various human-nature and institutional values of a given object differ among themselves as the phases of the human mind itself differ: that is, however marked the differences, the values are after all expressions of a common organic life. There is no clean-cut separation among them and at times they merge indistinguishably one into another. An organic mental-social life has for one of its phases an organic system of values. For example the æsthetic and moral values may seem quite unconnected, as in the case of a man with a "fair outside" but a bad character, and yet we feel that there is something beautiful about perfect goodness and something good about perfect beauty. It is agreed, I believe, that the best literature and art are moral, not, perhaps, by intention, but because the two

kinds of value are related and tend to coincide in their completeness. Alongside of these we may put truth-value, and say of the three that they are phases of the highest form of human judgment which often become indistinguishable.

The institutional values are also parts of the same mental-social system, distinguished by their derivation from a special social organism. They merge into the human-nature values, as I have suggested, and unless the two are in opposition it may be hard to distinguish between them. An institution, however, seldom or never corresponds so closely to a phase of human nature that the institutional values and the immediately human values on the whole coincide. An idea, in becoming institutional, merges itself with the whole traditional structure of society, taking the past upon its shoulders, and loses much of the breadth and spontaneity of our more immediate life. There are no institutions that express adequately the inner need for beauty, truth, righteousness and religion as human nature requires them at a given time: no church, for example, ever was or can be wholly christian.

It is apparent that the same object may have many kinds of value, perhaps all of those that I have mentioned. It is conceivable that man may turn all phases of his life towards any object and appraise it differently for each phase. Consider, for instance, an animal like the ox, of immemorial interest to the human race. It may be regarded as beautiful or ugly, may arouse the various emotions, as love, fear or anger, may give rise to moral and philosophical questions, may be the object of religious feeling, as in India, and have a value for the senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste. It has also, especially among the pastoral peoples, notable institutional values; plays a large part in law, ceremony and worship, and, in our own tradition, has an eponymous relation to pecuniary institutions.

Since values are a phase of the public mind, of the same general nature as public opinion; they vary as that does with the time, the group and the special situation. Every nation or epoch has its more or less peculiar value system, made up of related parts: any one can see that the values of the Middle Ages were very different from our own: they are a part of the *ethos*, the *mores*, or whatever you choose to call the collective state of mind.¹ Each individual, also, has a system of values of his own which is a differentiated member of the

¹ The human-nature values, of course, vary much less than the institutional values. Thus fashions vary infinitely, but conformity, the human nature basis of allegiance to fashion, remains much the same.

system of the group. And these various group and individual aspects hang together in such a way that no one aspect can be explained except by reference to the whole out of which it grows. You can hardly understand how a man feels about religion, for example, unless you understand also how he feels about his industrial position and about other matters in which he is deeply concerned; you must, so far as may be, grasp his life as a whole. And you will hardly do this unless you grasp also the social medium in which he lives. Any searching study of any sort of values must be the study of an organic social life.

The process that generates value is mental but not ordinarily conscious; it works by suggestion, influence and the competition and survival of ideas; but all this is constantly going on in and through us without our knowing it. I may be wholly unaware of the genesis or even the existence of values which live in my mind and guide my daily course: indeed this is rather the rule than the exception. The common phrase "I have come to feel differently about it" expresses well enough the way in which values usually change. The psychology of the matter is intricate, involving the influence of repetition, of subtle associations of ideas, of the prestige of personalities, giving weight to their example, and the like; but of all this we commonly know nothing. The idea of punishment after death, for example, has been fading for a generation past; its value for conduct has mostly gone; yet few have been aware of its passing and fewer still can tell how this has come about. This trait of the growth of values is of course well understood in the art of advertising, which aims, first of all, to give an idea weight in the subconscious processes, to familiarize it by repetition, to accredit it by pleasing or imposing associations, to insinuate it somehow into the current of thought without giving choice a chance to pass upon it at all.

If the simpler phases of valuation, those that relate to the personal aims of the individual, are usually subconscious, much more is this true of the larger phases which relate to the development of complex impersonal wholes. It is quite true that there are "great social values whose motivating power directs the activities of nations, of great industries, of literary and artistic 'schools,' of churches and other social organizations, as well as the daily lives of every man and woman—impelling them in paths which no individual man foresaw or purposed."¹ Nor is there anything mysterious about this: it is simply one aspect of the fact that the activities, even the existence,

¹ B. M. Anderson, Jr., *Social Value*, p. 116.

of the forms of social life are not necessarily or usually objects of consciousness to those involved in them. Every one must see that this is true as regards the past, and there is no reason to suppose that the present is different. Without doubt we are taking part in institutional movements of which we know nothing, and which remain for the future historian or sociologists to discover, just as the organic growth of language, of myth and the like, which went on in the minds of our remote predecessors, has been brought to light by the philologists and ethnologists of our own day. Most of the difficulty that we have in understanding statements of the sort just quoted arises from our not having assimilated fully the modern discovery that reflective consciousness embraces only a small part of life.

Values imply an act of selection, which may also be unconscious as well as conscious. Selection is the critical activity in which the organism turns one way or another under the pull of values; but we often do not know that, as individuals, we are in such a crisis, and still less do we know it for the groups and institutions of which we are a part. And while values may be altered more or less in the crisis—nothing stands still—they yet exist antecedently to it, very much as the military power of a nation exists before it is tested in war, or the “strength” of a presidential candidate before the campaign opens.

Like all phases of the human mind valuation may be regarded either in the individual or in the collective, or public, aspect; these two, of course, being aspects merely, which all phases of value, human-nature or institutional, present. Public valuation is the process viewed in a large way, as it goes on in the general mind, in its actual complexity of growth. In studying it one looks for broad features, with no special regard to persons. Private valuation is the same thing observed working itself out in the individual mind; it is a particular phase of the collective process that for various reasons may have an interest of its own. The distinction is the same as that between public and private opinion, the one being a collective, the other a particular view of a common whole.

Of these phases public valuation is for many purposes the more important. It is the real thing, the big thing, in which other phases of value find their relation and significance. In the widest sense it embraces the genesis, competition and organization of particular values; you aim to see the value movement as a living and various whole, of which all particular values and kinds of value are members. It is a real drama, with continual conflicts, crises and dénouements.

It may be too large to grasp satisfactorily, but at least we should recognize that nothing less affords an adequate basis for understanding the past or predicting the future. If we consider the valuation of particular objects of any sort, such as, let us say, the program of socialism, the works of Bernard Shaw, or Mr. Roosevelt's leadership; or of such staples of the stock market as wheat or New York Central shares; we may see that the position of these objects can be understood only with reference to the larger drama of valuation in which they have their parts: particular prices and judgments are not enough, we must see the interworking and tendency of the whole. "The play's the thing" and the function of the object in the play.

Next to this, if we must be content with a cross section, is the dynamic situation, the state of the play at a given time, made up of many coöperating and conflicting factors from the interworking of which the future must emerge.

I suppose, for example, that it is the ability to grasp the course or state of value in this large way that distinguishes the financier from the mere speculator, the statesman from the mere politician, or the competent critic of literature or art from the mere reviewer. Indeed it is apt to be what distinguishes the capable man from the incapable in any field. It may be said in general that the power to grasp process, to see the drama of values, is the height of the practical. It is what we all have to do in the real work of life, and the man who can do it has breadth, caliber, general capacity, can take responsibility, and does not require some one else to show him what to do.

Private valuation is a particular phase of public valuation, and one cannot be understood without the other. The individual in forming his special estimates, no matter how peculiar they may be, is working with material he gets from others—suggestions and impressions that come from the mental currents of his time and from the general stream of history. This material he works up in his own way, always at least a little different from that of any one else and sometimes a great deal. In proportion to the importance of these differences he exerts a special influence upon values in the general movement of thought. The tendency to ignore exceptional individuals, and consider only groups, is a serious error. The non-conformer, though he stand alone, is often the most significant fact in the situation, and may prove to be that one who, with God, is a majority.

Private valuation, then, stands in no opposition to public valuation; it is, even in the extremes of non-conformity, a phase of the

same process. The idea of an essential opposition between the two can arise only when public valuation is, wrongly, identified with value conventions or institutions. With these private valuation may easily be at variance.

Of course this large view of the process, which I call public valuation, should by no means be confused with institutional valuation. The latter is that part of the process whose explanation must be sought in those special tendencies of institutional life which often depart so widely from the simpler workings of human nature. Institutional valuation has its public and individual aspects like any other social phenomenon. The good churchman, in expressing the views of the church, may be expressing himself as truly as he does the institution; but it may be that his self is so institutionized as not to express human nature.

It is not uncommon, however, to think of public value, or, as it is usually called, social value,¹ as that which is fixed by some institution, or other formal process. There is something in this left over from those mechanical theories of society that could not see any unity in human life except this unity took a mechanical form—a contract, a creed, a government, or the like. The public or social must, then, be the institutional, the conventional, and this was set over against the individual, who was thought of as becoming social only by some such combination. I trust that I need not linger to refute this outworn idea.

The institutions, we may note in this connection, usually have rather definite and precise methods for the appraisal of values in accordance with their own organic needs. In the state, for example, we have ancient institutions of choice, which include elaborate methods of electing or appointing persons, as well as legislative, judicial and scientific authorities for passing upon ideas. The church has its tests of membership, its creeds, scriptures, sacraments, penances, hierarchy of saints and dignitaries, and the like, all of which serve as standards of value. The army has an analogous system. On the institutional side of art we have exhibitions with medals, prize competitions, election to academies and the verdict of trained critics: in science much the same, with more emphasis on titles and academic chairs. You will find something of the same sort in every well organized traditional structure. We have it in the universities, not

¹ I prefer the former term in such connections because the use of "social" to denote collective aspects, in antithesis to "individual," perpetuates the traditional fallacy that the individual is not social.

only in the official working of the institution, but in the fraternities, athletic associations and the like.

It is also noteworthy that institutional valuation is nearly always the function of a special class. This is obviously the case with the institutions mentioned, and it is equally true, though perhaps less obviously, with pecuniary valuation.

The application of these principles to the latter I hope to take up upon another occasion.¹

¹ A paper dealing with some phases of pecuniary valuation will appear in the *American Journal of Sociology* for January, 1913.

GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES

CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Dr. Wilhelm Stekel (5) makes an interpretation, truly Freudian in character, of the thefts of kleptomania as symbolisms of suppressed sexual acts. Mr. Albrecht (5) in a note says that "it is our firm conviction that criminal psychology may obtain from Freud's discoveries the most stimulating suggestions, and we hope that his theories and conclusions will be received with less prejudice here in America than they have encountered in Europe." Evidently his wishes are being gratified, although a few at least of the more careful psychologists and psychiatrists, are evincing a little of the wiser European conservatism toward the Freudian theories.

Doubtless there may be something of sexual symbolism in some of the abnormal acts of some of the psychoses, but to go to the extremes to which the writer in question goes seems absurd. To find in sexual symbolism the explanation for each and every psychosis indicates a psychological fanaticism that might well itself be looked upon as symbolic of a perverted sexual basis.

Those who read the above paper and also read "Berufswahl und Kriminalität" (6) will no doubt be willing to agree that Dr. Stekel is an extremist. In this article he maintains that the final psychosis of a neurotic individual is brought about by his struggle to suppress his inherent tendencies to crime. His theory of universal criminality among children and the relation of pseudo-epilepsy to crime are suggestive of Lombroso, although they lack the carefully worked out support that characterizes the theories of the latter.

The real thesis of the paper relates to the influence which criminal tendencies have upon the choice of a profession. The main influences, aside from paternal, which affect one in choosing a profession are held to be the desire to suppress, to give vent to, or to seek protection from criminal tendencies.

In a very few pages and with the citation of only three cases Wm. Healy (2) sets forth more clearly and concisely than others have done in several times the space, the essential psychological nature of

crime and the necessity of the application of the genetic method to each individual case. The differential results found by this method should be followed by differential treatment. He recognizes, with others, that a large per cent. of recidivism has its basis in feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, and insanity. Yet it is refreshing to find that he asserts that "no one germ will be found eating out the moral nature."

Dr. Bernard Glueck (1) by means of a thorough study of five cases that came under his observation in the criminal department of the Government Hospital for the Insane shows the existence of what he considers to be a born criminal type. This type is based on a defective mentality, an unstable nervous disposition of an hereditary character. He further believes that "the incorrigible criminal is sufficiently characterized by such unmistakable features (as) would enable us to recognize him when we see him, and thus justify his permanent isolation from the community." Of particular significance is the relation between the criminality and the insanity of these people.

"The same degenerative soil which makes the development of the psychosis possible in the one case, expresses itself in crime in another instance. The factors which determine whether the one or the other phase will manifest itself, depend entirely upon environmental conditions, and are accidental in nature. The stresses which these defective individuals meet with in freedom need not have such a strong influence upon them as to produce a psychosis. The want of moral attributes makes it possible for them readily to surmount many difficulties by means of some criminal act, difficulties, which in a normal person, would require extraordinary effort to remove. When placed, however, under the stress of imprisonment where they can neither slip away from under the oppressive situation, nor square themselves with it by some criminal act, the organism becomes affected to such a degree that the development of a psychosis is greatly facilitated. The character of the delusional fabric of these individuals is such that one can easily find a ready and more or less correct explanation for it. It is chiefly a compensatory reaction in an endeavor to make a certain unpleasant situation acceptable."

The strength of the position taken in this article is increased if we discuss in connection with it two other papers. In "The 'Imprisonment Psychosis,'" by Dr. W. W. Richardson (4), we have a description of cases that very closely simulate those cited by Dr. Glueck—cases with a defective, unstable basis which develop criminal

acts, and later upon incarceration, the psychosis. Dr. Richardson and the authorities quoted by him agree that the psychosis is brought on by the bringing of an unstable, defective character into conflict with the restrictions of prison discipline.

The conclusions of Dr. Richards' article (3) also lend support to those of Dr. Glueck. A comparison of facts in the United States with those in France and Germany seems to show that in all these countries a considerable number of the military offenses are committed by the insane, and that the insanity has been brought on by inability to withstand the strict military discipline. Dr. Richards states that a large per cent. of these cases recover (57 per cent. in the experience of the Government Hospital for the Insane).

In the study of the "imprisonment psychosis" and in that of the insane military offenders the majority of the cases seem to be due to dementia præcox, while Dr. Glueck maintains that his cases were not of this nature. Yet the results of each of these three studies agree in this: that a defective, deficient, or neurotic temperament unable to undergo the restrictions of society results in crime; unable to bear up under a more rigorous restriction (prison or army discipline), it results in a psychosis. Under the more favorable hospital environment it tends to recover *its* normal, though not *the* normal condition.

The further fact brought out by these writers, that this unstable class of people tend to be recidivists adds weight to Dr. Glueck's plea for a permanent segregation of the class.

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SPECIAL REVIEWS

ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Totemism, An Analytical Study. A. A. GOLDENWEISER. J. of Amer. Folk-Lore, 1910, 23, 179-293. (Reprint. Pp. 115.)

Most theoretical works on totemism are of a constructive or synthetic character, seeking to find the essence of the phenomenon in one or more basic sociological or psychological features, and then superadding other features as necessary or typical correlates in a coherent system of belief and practice that presents uniform or parallel characteristics wherever found. Goldenweiser's paper differs fundamentally in method from these, as its subtitle indicates. Its main purpose is to analyze out the various ethnological elements that form part of any given totemic system, to investigate the claims of each as a necessary feature of totemism, and to discover the most generalized psychological definition applicable to all its forms. In this way a new and independent standpoint is gained for the understanding of the mechanism of totemism.

In the introduction (pp. 1-5) the author deals with the definitions of totemism that have been given by three well-known English anthropologists, Frazer, Haddon and Rivers. It should be noted that Goldenweiser is not primarily concerned with a balanced review of prevalent theories of totemism and its origin, and hence refers to them only for illustrative purposes. It is the type of totemic theory exemplified by Frazer that he has chiefly in mind throughout the paper as opposed to his own standpoint, but issue is taken also with certain other writers on totemism, such as Lang, Major Powell, Hill-Tout, and Father Schmidt. As a result of his brief review of the definitions of totemism given by Frazer, Haddon and Rivers, Goldenweiser finds that there are chiefly five types of belief and custom that form elements of totemic systems as ordinarily defined. These are clan exogamy, totemic names of clans, a religious attitude toward the totem (an animal, plant or inanimate object serving as the protector or crest of the clan), taboos (generally of eating and killing) in regard to the totem, and belief in descent from the totem. As the author pertinently remarks, "The justification of regarding the various features of totemism as organically interrelated is not *a priori*

obvious." And the whole trend of Goldenweiser's argument is to the effect that they are not thus "organically interrelated" in origin or by a uniformly operative process of evolution, but have become so in whole or in part, and often with still other features not generally considered of such fundamental importance, by various processes of secondary association.

The major part of the paper is taken up with a survey, first, of the totemic features found in two areas in which totemism is characteristically developed—Australia and the northwest coast of America (pp. 5-52); secondly, of the general occurrence in different parts of the world of ethnological features, believed to be symptomatic of totemism, divorced from any totemic setting, and, conversely, of the frequent non-occurrence of one or more of the features in cases where one can nevertheless justly speak of a totemic society (pp. 53-86). A careful comparison of the two regions selected, as a test example, for relatively detailed treatment shows certain analogies and, on the other hand, several fundamental differences. The results of the comparison are summarized in tabular form (p. 51). We find that in both western British Columbia and Central Australia, exogamy, that is, the prohibition of intermarriage among the members of a social unit, is found, with this important difference, however, that while among the Indians of the north Pacific coast (Tlingit, Haida, Tsimshian, northern Kwakiutl) the totemic social units (phratries or clans) are exogamous as such, among the natives of Australia it is the larger non-totemic social units (phratries, otherwise known as "moieties," and marriage classes) that as a rule regulate exogamy, the totemic clans being in most cases exogamous only by virtue of their being phratric subdivisions. Moreover, the totemic social units of both areas bear totemic names, though the Australian clans are more consistent in this respect than the tribes of British Columbia. Of the four Tsimshian clans or phratries (sociological nomenclature is in somewhat of a muddle in West Coast ethnology) only two have names referring to their animal totems or crests (wolf and eagle); the phratric subdivisions (Tlingit clans and Haida "families"), while possessing their distinctive crests, have names of a local character, thus pointing to the inference that they are social units originally confined each to a single village; furthermore, the Eagle clan (probably better called phratry) of the Haida is just as often termed Gitins, a name of no ascertainable totemic significance. I am inclined to think that Goldenweiser makes too much of this relative lack of totemic names in British Columbia as a point of difference between

the two regions compared. The essential fact is the existence of crests associated with definite social units (phratries and clans), which may well be compared with the Australian totems that are associated with clans; the mere matter of whether or not the names of the totemic social units have distinct reference to the totems is, where the phratric or clan totems or crests themselves stand out clearly, of distinctly secondary importance.

Right here a more serious criticism must be made. For one who aims to be rigidly analytical in method, Goldenweiser does not carry his analysis far enough. The concept "an exogamous totemic clan" involves three distinct sociological concepts—the clan, the totem or crest, and the practice of exogamy. These are mutually independent concepts. Now the clan or other subtribal social unit is of such wide occurrence and is so much a matter of course as a starting point for a totemic society, that there is perhaps no need to isolate the phenomenon of a grouping into clans as one of the symptoms of totemism, though it might have been useful to entertain for a moment the possibility of totemic features becoming associated with a tribe or other undivided social unit as such. Be this as it may, it is clear that the concept of the totem, including that of crest or badge, as associated with the clan, should be analyzed out as one of the symptoms of totemism. Strange to say, Goldenweiser has not definitely done this, but has tacitly subsumed the notion under the concepts of exogamy of totemic social units and totemic naming. This seems unjustifiable, for Goldenweiser shows clearly that the clan totem as such can subsist without either exogamy, totemic naming, or, it may be added, worship of or other religious attitude toward the totem (see pp. 82–86). It may be objected that if we eliminate from a totemic system the totemic name, the taboo against eating, killing or acting in some other specific way toward the totem, the belief in descent from or other form of kinship with it, and a religious regard therefor, there is no totem left wherewith to totemize. The phenomenon of experience, divested of all its sense attributes, has evaporated into a metaphysical "Ding an sich." This objection is not valid. It happens not infrequently that a social unit is associated with an animal, plant or inanimate object merely as a crest or emblem, often guarding the right to display or represent it in some way or other. The totem is in such cases seen in its most simplified form, as a communal badge or heraldic symbol, or, again, it may be merely referred to in a legend. It should be noted in passing that the active association of art and totemism, on which Goldenweiser justly lays

stress, is not to be confounded, though it may be intimately connected, with the heraldic aspect of totemism. In British Columbia in particular, where the totem often tends to become a mere crest, it would have been quite in place to isolate the clan totem (crest) as such as one of the elements of totemism.

The further comparison given by the author of Australian and West Coast totemism discloses instructive differences. Taboos, particularly of eating and killing, are common enough in both areas, but while both totemic and non-totemic taboos are found in Australia, they are never associated in British Columbia with totems as such. In central Australia the belief in descent of the clansmen from the totem has taken firm hold, whereas it is but imperfectly developed among the natives of the Pacific coast, being absent among the northern tribes (Tlingit, Haida, Tsimshian) and occurring to a limited extent among the Kwakiutl. In Australia magical ceremonies for the increase of the food supply and the belief in reincarnation of mythical ancestors are intimately connected with the totemic system; in British Columbia, while both magical ceremonies and belief in reincarnation are found, they are not in any way brought into relation with the totemic social organization. On the other hand, while the practice of acquiring guardian spirits and its elaboration into a system of secret societies is bound up among the natives of the northwest coast of America with their system of crests, this is far from being the case in Australia, though the guardian spirit idea is not entirely absent in that continent. Furthermore, in western British Columbia it has left a deep impress upon the decorative art of the natives, and to some extent seems even to have been influenced in its development by that factor; in Australia, however, decorative art, which is far less highly developed than in British Columbia, is less apt to be involved in totemic ceremonies than in that region. The ranking of individuals and clans gives West Coast totemism a peculiar coloring of its own, this feature being entirely lacking in Australia. Finally, the number of totems found in any tribe of the West Coast is small, while an Australian tribe regularly comprises a very large number of totems. As a net result one certainly gets the feeling that the two totemic systems compared owe their undeniable points of similarity, coupled with other points of difference, to what has been termed convergent evolution, and that these totemic systems in themselves have arisen by a process of secondary association of ethnological elements of disparate nature and origin, rather than by one of an evolution of custom and belief,

with definitely determined sequences. It is the object of the latter part of the paper to heighten this feeling into assurance.

The pages devoted to exogamy and endogamy (pp. 53-73) are among the most interesting of the paper. Evidence is presented to show that clan exogamy frequently occurs unassociated with totemic features; further, that totemic clans need not be exogamous. It is made clear that clan exogamy is not the only type of group exogamy found among primitive peoples, but that we have also to deal with local exogamy, and kinship exogamy based on a classificatory system of relationships. Goldenweiser lays stress, and justly, on the importance and difficulty of determining, in cases of intercrossing or subdivision of social units, which of the units is inherently exogamous and which only secondarily so. Thus, a clan may be exogamous either by virtue of its own character as a social group, determining exogamous relations; or by virtue of its forming a part of a larger group of such character; or because it is localized in a village which is exogamous as such; or because all the members of the clan, according to a classificatory system of relationship, are held to be kin to one another, and thus debarred from intermarrying by the rule of kinship exogamy. Bearing these important distinctions in mind, Goldenweiser makes a good case for the view that the typical Australian totem clan is not a true exogamous unit, the rule of exogamy as such referring to the phratry or marriage class. To call a clan exogamous under such circumstances might be to commit a fallacy similar to that of describing New York State as a commonwealth forbidding slavery, when, as a matter of fact, this is already implied in the statement that it forms part of a larger commonwealth forbidding slavery.

As to the next totemic feature examined, that of totemic names (pp. 73-75), Goldenweiser gives a number of instances, besides those already adduced for British Columbia, of totem clans that do not bear the names of their totems, though the naming of a group from its totem is one of the "features" of totemism least often absent. Examples are then given to show that the totem is by no means always conceived of as the ancestor of the clansmen (pp. 75 and 76). The modest proportion of cases of taboo that are distinctly totemic in character is next indicated, while conversely it not infrequently happens that a totemic group observes no taboo in reference to its totem (pp. 76-80). The independence of the taboo as such of any necessary connection with totemism is conclusively demonstrated. Finally, in discussing the religious aspect of totemism (pp. 80-86), so

often believed to be the significant aspect of the problem, Goldenweiser shows, first, that the worship of plants and animals is a universal ethnological feature not at all necessarily connected with a totemic society; secondly, that the religious attitude toward the totem in a totemic society is often but weakly developed, at times even absent altogether. The religious side of totemism, even where present, never exhausts, and generally makes up but a small part of the total religious life of the totemic community. Thus the claims of totemism to be considered a distinct stage in the history of religion are disposed of without much difficulty.

The following pages of the paper (pp. 86-98), defining more sharply the character and genesis of the "totemic complex," sound the keynote of the study and form its most valuable and suggestive portion. Totemism is shown to consist not of one particular ethnological feature, or even of a combination of two or more such features, but might be understood as a process of intimate association of one or more of these with social units. Goldenweiser's own words are worth quoting here: "This association with social units is what constitutes the peculiarity of totemic combinations. Elements which are *per se* indifferent or vague in their social bearings (*i. e.*, as related to social units)—such as dances, songs, carvings, rituals, names, etc.—become associated with clearly defined social groups, and by virtue of such association themselves become transformed into social values not merely intensified in degree but definite and specific in character. The one obvious important means by which the association with definite social groups is accomplished is descent" (p. 93). In proceeding to define totemism Goldenweiser points out that a definition of the phenomenon which aims to be inclusive must exclude reference to the specific content of different totemic systems, must express the nature of totemism as a relation subsisting between ethnological elements rather than as their sum, and must exclude the notion of religion, for which he substitutes, as a more inclusive concept, "objects and symbols of emotional value." Owing to the fact that totemism is variable not only in place but in time, Goldenweiser thinks it necessary to describe it as an ever-changing process, rather than in purely descriptive terms as a static phenomenon. While it would be quite wrong to deny this dynamic element in totemism, one may reasonably doubt whether it would not have been better to neglect this aspect for the purpose of a definition. As Goldenweiser's definition now reads, "Totemism is the tendency of definite social units to become associated with objects and symbols

of emotional value" (p. 97), the emphasis seems somewhat misplaced, for all ethnological complexes, and, for that matter, all single elements of custom and belief, must be understood dynamically, that is, historically. In the definition as stated there is somewhat of a contrast implied, though only vaguely, between totemism as a dynamic phenomenon and other cultural phenomena, a contrast which naturally weakens rather than strengthens the emphasis on the historical method of ethnology that Goldenweiser has in mind. The revised, and, to my mind, more acceptable, definition would read: Totemism is the association of definite social units with objects and symbols of emotional value. The brief psychological definition given by Goldenweiser, "Totemism is the specific socialization of emotional values" (p. 97), while intelligible in the light of all that precedes it, is hardly serviceable as a definition aiming to stand on its own feet; the process of association, while implied in it, is not sufficiently emphasized.

In the final pages of the paper (pp. 98-110), on the whole its weakest portion, the methodology of current evolutionary theories of totemic origin is first illustrated, then unfavorably criticized. Goldenweiser takes issue with the assumption of a regular one-line evolution of the forms of totemic society. He points out that it is unwarranted to select one feature of totemism as the primary element historically of the whole complex, and to establish a natural sequence for the appearance of the other features as growing up out of the primary feature. Merely plausible or intelligible evolutionary theories of the origin and development of cultural phenomena can in this way be built up without end, and it is often difficult to choose among them. Plausibility as such, however, has no evidential value. Another fundamental error of the evolutionist school of anthropology is the failure to recognize the vast importance of borrowing and assimilation of cultural elements. Processes which in higher levels of culture are recognized without question are often tacitly ignored in the study of primitive society. The lack of documented history is too often, ostrich fashion, taken to mean the lack of history, and primitive customs are too often thought of as the psychologico-mechanical product of "primitive" modes of thought acted upon by alleged principles of social evolution. That a whole totemic complex may be due primarily to processes of borrowing and assimilation is shown by the totemism of the western Shuswap, Lillooet, Chilcotin, and Carrier (pp. 103-106), for among these Indians we can trace the profound totemic influence of the coast tribes. The method employed

by Goldenweiser in his study of totemism, the analysis of a cultural phenomenon into its elements and the historical interpretation of the phenomenon as an association, varying in character from place to place, of these elements, is the method so often insisted upon by Professor Franz Boas as that best fitted to give fruitful results in anthropological investigations. The insistence on the importance of mutual cultural influence of neighboring tribes is also one of the leading notes in the ethnological method of Boas and his school. The examples given by Goldenweiser of cultural borrowing in British Columbia in other phases than totemism serve to illustrate further his methodological standpoint.

One is at times disposed to complain of the rather small number of examples given or range of tribes covered for certain points, but it should be remembered that the study is in no sense a survey of totemistic fact, any more than, as we have seen, it is one of totemistic theories. Once and again a fact is not stated quite accurately (thus, p. 42, totem poles can hardly be said to be a striking feature of all or even most British Columbia villages), or is doubtfully pertinent to the argument (thus, p. 21, the restriction of whaling among the Nootka to certain families has nothing to do with taboo). These are but slight blemishes, however, that in no way seriously impair the value of the study. It is hardly too much to say that Goldenweiser's *Totemism* forms one of the most notable, perhaps the most notable, contribution to ethnological method yet produced by American anthropologists.

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Sociology in its Psychological Aspects. CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.
New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1912. Pp. xiv+417.

This clearly written work is perhaps the most explicit of any of our recent sociological texts in its recognition of psychology as fundamental. The author expresses his indebtedness to Professors Dewey and Mead for his point of view, and readers of the *BULLETIN* will not find it unfamiliar. But the theory takes on added definiteness and significance in its applications, and the book should make a valuable contribution toward the sociological method.

Functional psychology is interpreted first of all as implying "that consciousness does work, does function, and as such has a survival value in the life process." This is against a mechanistic

theory according to which the explanation of social phenomena is to be sought in physico-chemical processes, whereas consciousness is not a factor and performs no work in the social life. But, consciousness in its functioning is itself regular, and does its work within universal organic processes, especially the processes of habit and adaptation. This, as against an indeterministic point of view which would make consciousness a lawless factor.

Assuming then that consciousness does work, the key to its nature is to be found in the character of the life process in which it functions. The capital fact here is that the life process is from the outset essentially social. "Life is not and cannot be an affair of individual organisms. The processes of both nutrition and reproduction in all higher forms of life involve a necessary interdependence among organisms of the same species, which, except under unfavorable conditions, gives rise to group life and psychical interaction. . . . Looked at from the standpoint of the whole evolution of life, it is really the result of the breaking up of the life-process into several relatively independent centers while the process itself remains a unity." Social life is in part a function of the food process (including defense against enemies as the negative side of the food process) and in part a function of the reproductive process including as the more important part of this the care of offspring. The importance of this second factor in the author's opinion needs to be emphasized in contrast with social theories which seem to imply that the only function of the social life is to secure an adequate supply of material goods.

As the life-process is social so also is the individual mind. Consciousness is the chief connecting line between individuals living in association. "Instincts, emotions and sensations of one individual organism often seem made to fit into corresponding mental processes of other organisms; and varied means of interstimulation and response are developed." For "the life-process of the individual is only a part of the larger life-process of the group to which he belongs." When life activities—procuring of food and protection against enemies—are carried on by groups, the only way the mind can control them is through some form of psychic interconnection between the individuals of the group. "The social character of mind is an expression of the fact that it has to do with mediation of process which is carried on by several coöperating individual units; while society, the psychical interrelation of these individuals, means that there is one common process of living carried on by these co-

operating units on the psychic plane, that is, on the plane of interstimulation and response. Society in the concrete sense, in other words, may be practically defined as a group of individuals who carry on a common life-process by means of interstimulation and response."

Social coördination or "coadaptation" is then fundamental for the sociologist. It is from this point of the view that the author would explain and evaluate the various processes which have been emphasized as the essential features of social life. "Folkways" are simply regular modes of social activity in a given group of people, and might better be called "social habits," for they are found in small groups such as the family as well as in large groups. Simmel's "types of coördination or association" would on this basis get a principle for classification, and without the consideration of the actual situations in which various types arise there is practically no limit to the number that might be enumerated. Subjective expressions of coördination are found in common feelings, ideas, and beliefs. Imitation plays a part in mediating relatively simple and unconscious coördination between individuals, but it is an error to confine attention to this one element since "unlikeness of activity is necessary for many of the higher forms of social coördination." Again, sympathy and understanding are both products and instruments of coördination. Sympathy is probably proportionate "not to the amount of resemblance (Giddings) but to the harmony of the coördination between individuals."

Coördination in so far as it persists in uniform fashion may be called "social habit." As the life-process encounters shocks, disturbances, and various maladjustments, other types of communication are especially important to bring about social change; criticism, discussion, suggestion are evoked. Revolutions have for their first weapon certain destructive and disintegrating ideas. A certain anarchy often marks the violence and completeness with which habits and institutions are overthrown, and at such times the more simple and animal activities come to expression.

The processes of social adaptation may be stated not merely in objective terms as above but also in the more subjective terms of social self-control, under which would fall activities of government, education, religion, and moral ideas. The phenomena of group will, group individuality of interests, and group rivalry may also be viewed as aspects of the general processes of coördination. Successive chapters take up the rôles of instinct, feeling, and intellect in the general social process.

This general point of view enables the author to recognize the rôle of imitation (Baldwin, Tarde) and sympathy (Giddings), while not according to either the fundamental position as constitutive principle of social life. Each is the instrument of interaction. Perhaps the advantage of the author's point of view is best seen in his chapter on the theory of social progress. The anthropo-geographical theory, the biological or ethnological theory, the economic theory, the ideological theory are all seen to rest upon the recognition of some one factor in the life process to the exclusion of others. The range and variety of human instincts on the one hand and the flexibility of human intelligence on the other are evidences of the impossibility of defining the whole life process, and consequently the lines and causes of progress, by any single one of the theories named. It may be arrogating more to the adjective "sociological" than this would necessarily carry to designate the synthetic theory of progress which would give this due recognition to all factors as "*the* sociological" theory, but without disputing over the name the point of view may be approved by the social psychologist.

Numerous queries as to detail might be raised—*e. g.*, it seems to suppose a very highly specialized set of instincts, to regard "truth telling" and "deception" as specific instincts, instead of viewing them as merely instrumental factors in larger wholes. But I remark only on a certain uncertainty as to just what is implied in a "functional" view of a process. Sometimes (*e. g.*, p. 195) it seems to be assumed that to give a functional interpretation means to explain an act, such as talking, in terms of its utility for something else. Thus it is said that the functional interpretation breaks down at certain points, for "We communicate, for example, oftentimes when we have no need of doing so in order to carry on a common life-process. We talk with each other, merely for the sake of talking without reference to the functioning of any correlated activities." The thought here seems to be that a certain level of life-process might be maintained without any members that talked just for the sake of talking; therefore such activities are superfluities and non-functional. But surely one might say that such a thoroughly stripped-to-its-fighting-weight life-process would be quite lacking in some of the equipment for good society. Must the life-process exclude all self-entertainment? On the other hand in the chapter on the Rôle of Intellect, although the author sometimes speaks of the intellect as instrumental for adaptation to environment—as though the environment were "here" already and man's only task were to fit into it—the prevailing

thought is rather of creating by ideals a "subjective environment" toward which the objective environment is to be shaped. This is not to make intellect instrumental to a (non-intellectual) life-process. It is rather to bend the life-process toward standards and ideals which could have no existence without intellect. Intellect, does not merely "function" by "mediating" social adaptations; it is itself a creative agent, a constituent factor in determining what the adaptation shall be. I do not mention this ambiguity because it is peculiar to Professor Ellwood's discussion. It is not infrequent, but the two interpretations mark fundamentally different views as to consciousness.

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RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

Psychology of the Religious Life. GEORGE MALCOLM STRATTON.
New York: Macmillan, 1911. Pp. ix + 376.

The appearance of this volume in the well-known "Library of Philosophy," edited by J. H. Muirhead, is an indication of the increasing importance of the study of the psychology of religion. It is similarly significant that it is written by one so long and fruitfully devoted to experimental psychology. The book is marked by the same clearness and charm of style as the author's earlier work on *Experimental Psychology and Its Bearing upon Culture*.

More than any other treatise in its field, it has employed materials from the oriental religions. The use of Persian, Indian, Egyptian, and Chinese religious literatures is a notable extension of the general subject. The prayer, the hymn, the myth, the sacred prophecy are regarded as the best sources, and these are found in the great canonical collections. Only secondary importance is attached to the introspective reports of individuals. The works of Tylor and Frazer are employed for the accounts of less civilized peoples, but the names of several recent investigators like Spencer and Gillen, Howitt, Rivers, and Dudley Kidd do not appear among the numerous references cited.

The book is analytical and descriptive. Approaching the subject in this way, religion is found to be marked by conflict, and this word conflict is the key to the book. There are four parts. The first treats in seven chapters of the conflicts in regard to feeling and emotion. Part two is concerned with the conflicts in regard to action and has five chapters. Conflicts in regard to religious thought

occupy ten chapters in the third part. The fourth part presents the "Central Forces of Religion" in chapters treating of The Idealizing Act, Change and Permanence in the Ideal, and Standards of Religion.

It is my impression that in spite of the author's caution in the introduction against allowing himself any human interest in such a study, his work would have gained in scientific clearness as well as in its grip upon the reader if he had placed the last part first and ordered all the others by it. As it stands one is indeed impressed by the variety and depth of the conflicts in religion but there seems to be no adequate statement of their source or end.

The author shows an intimate appreciation of the various moods and tempers of mankind. The reader is everywhere impressed by the range of insight and sympathy for the most divergent types, and by the remarkable skill in portraying them. Now it is indeed important to build out in this impressive way the complexity and variation of the religious consciousness, in its appreciation and contempt of self, its breadth and narrowness of sympathy, its opposition of gloom and cheer, its activity and passivity, its opposition of picture and thought, its contrasts of many gods and one, of divinity at hand and afar off. It is valuable to have an elaborate and artistic catalogue of these differences and conflicts, but the demand constantly asserts itself for simplification, and for explanation of all this variety by a view of the deep working causes.

This demand presses for expression in the author's own mind and there are many asides, as it were, in which this demand rises to the surface of his thought. These are doubtless the "lapses due to the infirmity of the flesh" for which the reader's charity is asked on page 2. Many readers will wish that the final fruitful and illuminating "lapse" which begins on page 325 had taken place in the introduction, so that everything might have been ordered by it from the first. On this last mentioned page an account of the idealizing act is begun which reveals the sources of all the conflicts of feeling, action, and thought in religious experience. A few sentences from this part will show how the author would explain the preceding conflicts. "It is a mark of human nature—though the same trait appears in life still lower—to transform its neighborhood." "The impulse to mould the facts until they more nearly conform to some inner rule and standard—to supplement them, if need be, by direct addition—appears in many different forms between idealization's infancy and its maturer years." "The completion of the observed world by adding to it that great unobserved world so real to the

religious, is therefore no anomaly." "The instinct to remodel the given fact to our satisfaction—at first to meet physical needs, but soon to meet the no less urgent need of beauty and justice and intelligibility—by this wide instinct all are moved." "The ideal is the picture of what will satisfy in fullest measure our desires."

Here, then, is the key. Man, like all sentient forms, is characterized by various desires and cravings. In the lower stages these are relatively few and primal. In the higher stages they branch and ramify under the pressure of environment and habit. Greater emphasis upon this principle would have brought the diversity of religions, and the contrasts within any single faith more completely under the solving notions of genetic and social psychology. It is surely a proper function of scientific psychology to show how the conflicts of individual and group experience stand related to the epochs of growth, to the run of attention, to the ground patterns determined by the struggle for existence, and by the pace set by the leaders and geniuses of races. A hint of this larger explanation appears on page 33 where the "intellectual vertigo and revulsion" of Buddhism with its endless transmigrations and repetitions is casually referred to the correlated "machine-like round of life." There are doubtless "types of character that are permanently magnetized in opposite ways," but it is the older static psychology which stops at that point, without inquiring into the environmental influences and other forces which have played the part of the magnets.

Religion is conceived as the supreme expression of the idealizing activity. It is well defined (page 343) as "man's whole bearing toward what seems to him the Best, or Greatest—where 'best' is used in a sense neither in nor out of morality, and 'greatest' is confined to no particular religion." Therefore, "no clear line marks the transition from religion to other human activities." The Best is predominantly social (pages 337 f.) and would seemingly be regarded as primarily social but for "motives connected with high curiosity" apart from any practical interest. The author's mild dissent from recent attempts to state religion in terms of the social consciousness is seen in the following: "The reverence which men have shown the Highest has usually been, not alone because it fulfilled their social needs, but also because of its satisfaction to sensuous and æsthetic and causal and logical needs, which grow, it is true, by the mutual friction and support of men, but seem not to originate in this way nor to be part and parcel of the social feeling itself."

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Prophezeiungen: Alter Aberglaube oder neue Wahrheit? M. KEMMERICH. München: Langen, 1911. Pp. vi + 435.

Dr. Kemmerich tells us that his study of prophecy has completely altered his understanding of that phenomenon. He was at first convinced that only superstitious persons could believe in the announcement of future events; and he attributed the realization of certain "prophecies" either to luck, to simple coincidence, or to clever conjectures. But he has come to believe that future events can be seen in advance. His book is intended to demonstrate that that fact is scientifically established. "The belief in prophecy is not an antiquated superstition. It is a new truth of which we make a strict demonstration. We know now that sight into the future exists."

Let it be clearly understood that the author's purpose is simply to verify the existence of the fact. That is without doubt the first task of science. Whether the fact can be explained and how it is to be explained are questions independent of the one with which he is concerned.

The book contains twelve chapters. The third indicates the method of the demonstration and answers objections. The twelfth establishes scientific conclusions regarding prophecy. The ten other chapters discuss the facts; after mentioning antiquity, the Middle Ages, the modern period, the author examines particularly: (1) The prophecy of the Abbé Hermann of the Cistercian Monastery of Lehnin in the year 1300, regarding the fate of the House of Brandenburg; (2) Christina Ponitowssken, the clairvoyant, of the seventeenth century and her prophetic visions; (3) the prophecies of Christian of Heering of Prossen in the eighteenth century; (4) the prophecy of Johann Adam Müller at the beginning of the nineteenth century; (5) the prophecy of Cazotte on the French Revolution; (6) the prophecies of Madame de Ferriem, a contemporary; (7) and finally, the prophecies of Michel Nostradamus in the sixteenth century.

It is impossible in a brief account to summarize the discussion of all these facts, but however surprised one may be at finding the prophecies of Nostradamus seriously examined with the purpose of showing their agreement with future events, one is compelled to admit that the discussion is conducted with much logical strictness. Certain quatrains of the *Centuries* of Nostradamus are truly very curious. They are authentic, drawn from events anterior to the events designated, sufficiently clear in spite of their intended obscurity. They provide the author with several truly interesting

examples of "true" prophecy. Demonstrations of such a kind cannot be abbreviated; we refer the reader to the book.

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Das Zungenreden, geschichtlich und psychologisch untersucht. E. MOSIMAN. Tübingen: F. C. B. Mohr, 1911. Pp. 137.

This book was originally written in English in answer to a prize-question offered by the McCormick Theological Seminary. After revision and completion, with the assistance of Professor Johannes Weiss, of Heidelberg, it was published in Germany. It comprises historical researches on the existence of the facts of speaking with tongues (pp. 1-83), psychological explanations (pp. 86-124), and a final chapter, rather theological, in which are discussed chiefly the events of the Pentecost as they are related in the Acts of the Apostles.

The problem of "glossolalia" and of the "gift of tongues" goes back to certain accounts of the New Testament. There these manifestations of involuntary speech are attributed to the Holy Spirit. Other historical manifestations nearer us permit a fuller study of the question and throw some light upon the facts, and their psychological explanation, often permitting one to cast aside the hypothesis of the intervention of spirit.

In addition to the manifestations related in the New Testament, considered by the author in the first three chapters, two chapters are devoted to other instances: among the Montanists, the Camisards, the Jansenists, the Irvingians, and in recent revivals (in Wales, in India, etc.).

The theory of the automatic and unconscious movements of the organs of phonation, produced by our subconscious activity, suffices to explain a great many cases. A sort of internal suggestion takes place and sets in activity the nervous centers. At times the sounds produced have no sense; at times they are intelligible only to those to whom the power of interpretation is given; at times they are in the language of the subject and of the auditors; at times they are a tongue foreign to the subject. It is well known that in this last case very curious causes leading to a misinterpretation of the phenomenon have been discovered. The author affirms that there exists no incontrovertible instance of a true use of a foreign tongue (p. 118). A woman in Chicago utters Chinese words, but she has heard them in a Chinese laundry. Another person speaks Hebrew words, but on investigation one discovers that she has lived as a servant with a

Hebraic scholar who was in the habit of repeating Hebrew texts aloud.

The question dealt with in the last chapter is the relation which exists between the gift of tongues mentioned in the New Testament and "glossolalia" in general. The author identifies them and gives them both a purely psychological explanation; but in order to do so he is led to affirm that the Biblical account is not exact (*ungeschichtlich dargestellt*). At this point the question becomes one of historical criticism, or of theology, with which we are not concerned here. The reasons advanced by Mosiman appear to us to some extent arbitrary. They are not convincing. There are theologians who hold an opposite opinion (comp. Pratt, *Théologie de Saint-Paul*. Paris: Beauchesne; pp. 175, 184).

An extensive bibliography is added.

JULES PACHEU

PARIS

L'Expérience Mystique et l'Activité Subconsciente. J. PACHEU. Paris: Perrin, 1911. Pp. 312.

This interesting work contains a simple and clear exposition of Mystical Union (the central fact of mysticism), and a criticism of the subconscious theory as applied to that experience. Using first-class authorities, the author separates clearly the affective from the noetic element at every one of the several degrees of that experience. It includes feeling and also knowledge: the Mystic is aware, even if in an obscure way, of the divine presence.

The exposition is done with much exactness; it evinces a thorough knowledge of the topic. The author insists very properly upon the ethico-religious value of this experience; he shows the harmonious development to which mystics tend beyond asceticism; one sees very clearly how the mystical experience makes part of the religious life. The theory which would bring back these facts to mental pathology is vigorously discussed.

Can mystical experience be explained as an eruption from the subconscious? Must it be supposed that the mystical intuition is nothing more than a revelation of the subject to himself, helped by his reflection and his work and which, having ripened subconsciously, appears to him external and superior to himself? The interruptions and the disproportion which characterize these states have seemed to some adequately explained by the hypothesis of the subconscious, on condition that it be given its full value, and that it should be assimilated

lated to, for instance, scientific and artistic invention. Against this hypothesis, the author formulates the following objections: (1) How are we to explain on this hypothesis the sporadic and at times unique character of the mystical intuitions? If the subconscious is the author of them, it should easily lead to a flowering of phenomena of that kind. (2) The efficacious play of the subconscious supposes a kind of mental disaggregation; how is one to conciliate these dissociations with the admirable unity of the mystical life? (3) The continuity of memory and of consciousness in the mystics seems to establish the unity of their consciousness. (4) In order to explain the mystical facts, one is compelled to enlarge the subconscious hypothesis to such a degree that it loses all precise meaning. Certain authors, particularly M. Delacroix, endow the subconscious so richly that it "becomes a marvellous fairy more difficult to scientifically imagine than Viviane, or Morgane, the fay, or simply the divine reality of which the mystics speak." The posited creative subconsciousness—a dynamic, constructive automatism—is in fact copied after the descriptions of the great mystics. "This hypothesis, suggested by the facts which are to be explained, is applied to them as a sufficient explanation. There is a gap and an apparent *petitio principii*: that which is assumed is precisely that which is in question."

Our author is of the opinion that subconsciousness cannot be left to its own resources; it seems rather an instrument in the hands of a superior power, God. As psychologists, our conclusions cannot affirm God; but we have not the right to exclude Him, in fact psychology seems to point to Him.

In closing, the author quotes from a letter in which M. Delacroix explains how he conceives the relation between psychology and metaphysics and also religion.

The only critical remark which I will make refers to the fourth objection. The moment always comes when an hypothesis resembles the facts for which it is intended as an explanation; it must perforce contain them. The question is whether it contains only those facts; if so, the hypothesis is in truth merely the expression of those facts and it cannot serve to go beyond them, to relate them to other facts. But is this truly the case of the subconscious hypothesis? I do not think so. The authors criticized by M. Pacheu have merely complicated an hypothesis already in existence in order to make it include the new facts in question; and they have found support in intermediary facts, for instance, the rôle of subconsciousness in artistic and scientific invention.

The book of M. Pacheu manifests a very sincere and talented effort to place the religious reader face to face with the analyses and theories of the psychologists, and to draw from them whatever is possible from the point of view of religion. This book shows that psychologists and religious souls can walk together for a considerable time. If the moment comes—the moment of explanation—where they diverge, they know at least on what they agree and on what they disagree. This book shows also that serious differences can be indicated with much tolerance and perfect courtesy.

H. DELACROIX

SORBONNE, PARIS

Mysticism as Seen through its Psychology. W. E. HOCKING. *Mind*, 1912, 21, 38-61.

This is in part a criticism of the views concerning mysticism held by Royce, Godfernaux, Delacroix, and Leuba, and in part a positive theory (both psychological and metaphysical) of the mystic consciousness. Royce's mistake, according to Hocking, is in failing to distinguish the mystic's motive, which is worship, from the motive of speculation in general. Leuba's interpretation of the mystic's love as a branch of the sexual impulse is only a half truth; the whole truth being that sexual love is a part of the mystic worship. Godfernaux is right in viewing rhythm as the great characteristic of the mystic life, but he is mistaken in identifying this with the vital rhythm of coenesthesia. Delacroix recognizes the rhythm of the mystic consciousness but regards it as not absolutely essential and as, in fact, outgrown by the greater mystics. As a fact the mystic never does and never can get beyond this rhythm, for it is a function of his will and is correlated with the laws of attention. It is, in fact, based upon the psychological and epistemological law of alternation,—the necessity of turning from the whole to the part and from the part to the whole.

JAMES B. PRATT

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

Essai d'une Classification du Mystique. F. PICAUVET. *Rev. Phil.*, 1912, 74, 1-26.

The mystics have been classified according to two principles: the perfection they aimed at, and their nervous abnormal phenomena. The author would make three classes: (1) The Mystics who seek a development of their personality by means of union with the Su-

preme Perfection, but who do not make use of theurgical and religious practices. (2) The Mystics who seek God in order to realize a fuller personality and who make use of the well-known methods of mystical worship. (3) The Mystics who do not aim at individual perfection, whose physiological misery is as profound as their psychological deficiencies.

J. H. LEUBA

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

Les Etats Mystiques Négatifs. G. TRUC. Rev. Phil., 1912, 73, 610-628.

After considering in a previous paper the state of grace, the author takes up in the present article correlated negative states: lukewarmness, "acedia," dryness. He makes a detailed and careful descriptive analysis of these states. His chief conclusions are: (1) These negative states are functionally related to the state of grace. They involve regret for an affective experience which one has previously realized, or which one despairs of ever obtaining; they include therefore a feeling of irritation at one's impotency. (2) These states are only particular cases of experiences existing outside the religious life.

J. H. LEUBA

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

The Several Origins of the Ideas of Unseen Personal Beings. JAMES H. LEUBA. Folk-Lore, 1912, 23, 148-171.

The Varieties, Classification, and Origin of Magic. JAMES H. LEUBA. American Anthropologist, 1912, N. S., 14, 350-367.

Professor Leuba, an original thinker in the field of religious psychology, discusses in the articles under review, two fundamental questions interesting alike to the psychologist and to the ethnologist, questions concerning which there is still, and rightfully so, not a little disagreement among even the most competent authorities. Rejecting the theory of the origin of the ideas of superhuman personal powers in some one class only of phenomena, *e. g.*, dreams and related states (Tylor), worship of the dead (Spencer), personification of natural objects (Max Müller), a theory ascribed by him to "the passion for simplicity and unity" in anthropologists and historians, he adduces psychological and historical evidence in support of the following four propositions: (1) Gods grew out of several different ideas of superhuman beings. (2) These beings had independent origins. (3) The

attributes of the gods differ according to their origin. (4) The historical gods are usually mongrel gods, the outcome of the combination of characteristics belonging to superhuman beings of different origins.

In his position as to the non-unitary origin of such beliefs Professor Leuba places himself in the company of the so-called "American school" of anthropologists, who for some years past have assumed the same attitude with respect to "totemism," and other phenomena of a socio-religious character, which the earlier observers and interpreters of the mental activities of non-civilized peoples, almost without exception, considered as having had a unitary origin. Another point argued for, and quite properly, is that several of the sources indicated may have operated simultaneously—"so that several gods of different origins may have, from the first, divided the attention of the community"; and, moreover, *succession* (not at all limited to any one order), as well as *simultaneity*, is possible,—thus, "a ghost-ancestor may have first attained dominance, and, later on, a Great Maker." The idea of a "Maker" can occur very early in the history of the races, and Professor Leuba does not err in stating that "it may be that a crude conception of a Creator is attained even earlier than that of a soul or a double." Today, the belief in the existence of God, Professor Leuba holds, "rests almost entirely" on experiences included under "the needs of the heart" and "the needs of conscience,"—such empirical data (together with the metaphysical arguments) as dreams, hallucinations, trances, personification of striking phenomena, the idea of a Maker, etc., "having lost all or almost all the value they had once as prompters of the belief in God."

The question of "primitive montheism," so much discussed of late by Andrew Lang, Father Schmidt and others, Professor Leuba answers by pointing out that "the High Gods proceeded from an independent and specific source; they are, or were originally, the Makers." The fact that low spirits and not the High God are worshipped among primitive peoples does not represent a deterioration from the earliest condition of humanity, but "rather the facts are consistent with a natural development and indicate the presence of no factor not operative in modern progressive societies." Something might perhaps be urged against the author's derivation of the "High Gods" from the "Makers" alone. His emphasis on the facts of childhood is worth attention. Professor Leuba deprecates the application of the term "monotheism" to belief of the uncivilized in the "High God," since it by no means implies that there exist no other gods but him.

By "magic" Professor Leuba understands "those practices intended to secure some definite gain by coercitive action in essential disregard (1) of the quantitative relations implied in the ordinary and in the scientific dealings with the physical world; (2) of the anthropopathic relations obtaining among persons." To this he adds that "although magic never makes an anthropopathic appeal, it frequently brings to bear its peculiar coercitive virtue upon feeling beings." The aim of magic is then to compel souls, spirits, or gods to do the operator's will, or prevent them from doing their own. As is noted (p. 352), it is only by far-fetched explanations that several types of magic can be brought within the limits of Frazer's classification into "homeopathic (or imitative)" and "contagious." Examples of these are "certain dances performed by the women when the men are engaged in war" (*e. g.*, among Kafirs of the Hindu Kush, Yuki Indians, natives of Madagascar, etc.), and the very large and significant class of magic-phenomena known as "will-magic."

Professor Leuba offers a classification of his own, viz. (1) principle of repetition; (2) principle of transmission of an effect from one object to another (sympathetic magic); (3) principle of efficiency of will-effort. The conceptions of the savage, the author thinks, are not "clear and definite," but "hazy and fluid." This generalization can hardly apply to all primitive peoples, much less to all individuals among them. The origins of magical behavior, according to Professor Leuba, while not capable of interpretation simply from the principles of association, may be classified, nevertheless, according to the kind of association they illustrate. Considering the nature of the power involved, magical practices may be grouped as follows: (1) practices in which there is no idea of a power belonging to the operator or his instrument, and passing thence to the object of the magical art (much of so-called sympathetic magic, many taboos, most modern superstitions); (2) non-personal powers are believed to belong to the magician himself, or to particular objects, such as the magician's instruments, and to pass from these into other objects, or to act upon them so as to produce certain effects; (3) will-magic, including the cases in which the magician feels that his will-effort is an efficient factor.

Among the principles of explanation (of unequal value) of magical behavior the author cites the following phenomena: Children often amuse themselves by making prohibitions and backing them up with threats of punishment,—the make-believe of one person may be taken quite seriously by another; threats of untoward happenings,

made for the purpose of preserving things vital to the life and prosperity of the tribe; the motive which leads civilized people to make vows nowadays; the spontaneous response of the organism to specific situations. Besides these cases, in all of which "movements and behaviors appear independently of any magical intention, and afterward acquire a magical significance," there comes a time, when "magic no longer arises only by chance, but new forms are created deliberately," and "from this moment there must have been a tendency to treat, according to more or less definite principles, every difficult situation." And here belong most of the "like produces like" practices found all over the globe in all ages of mankind.

Professor Frazer, in the opinion of the author, "seems to have overlooked the fundamental difference between mere association of ideas and the essential processes involved in magic." Magic cannot be explained as "a simple (mistaken) recognition of the similarity and contiguity of ideas."

ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN

CLARK UNIVERSITY

On Faith in its Psychological Aspects. B. B. WARFIELD. The Princeton Theol. Rev., 1911, 9, 537-566.

Professor Warfield's paper is a carefully written and convincing discussion of the meaning of the word belief, and in particular of the difference expressed by "belief" and "knowledge."

"Matters of faith," he writes in a partial summary, "are different from matters of knowledge—not as convictions less clear, firm or well-grounded, not as convictions resting on grounds less objectively valid, not as convictions determined rather by desire, will, than by evidence—but as convictions resting on grounds less direct and immediate to the soul, and therefore involving a more prominent element of trust, in a word as convictions grounded in authority, testimony as distinguished from convictions grounded in rational proof. The two classes of convictions are psychologically just convictions; they are alike, in Dr. Baldwin's phrase, 'forced consents'; they rest equally on evidence and are equally the product of evidence; they may be equally clear, firm and assured; but they rest on differing kinds of evidence." It is the "open implication of 'trust' in the conception of 'belief' which rules the usage of these terms."

Now, as there is "an element of trust in all our convictions, 'faith,' 'belief,' may be employed of them all." "In what we call religious faith this prominent implication of trust reaches its height." "Faith in God, and above all, faith in Jesus Christ is just trusting Him in its purity."

In the remainder of the paper (pp. 557-566) the author examines critically, in the light of his analysis, the opinion of certain theologians.

It appears to me unfortunate that "faith" is used throughout this article as synonymous with "belief," for these two terms cover a range of mental experience wide enough to make possible a discriminating use of these terms.

One is surprised to find that the only contemporary psychologists who apparently have been consulted are those who wrote on this topic in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. I cannot help believing that a wider knowledge of psychological science on the part of theologians would redound to the advantage of both theology and psychology.

J. H. LEUBA

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

The Journal of Religious Psychology, including its Anthropological and Sociological Aspects, edited by G. STANLEY HALL and ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN. Volume V., 1912.

- (1) *The Belief in Immortality*. SIMON SPIDLE. Pp. 5-51.
- (2) *Satan and his Ancestors from a Psychological Standpoint*. COLLYS F. SPARKMAN. Part I. Historical Development, pp. 52-86; Part II. The Rise, Growth and Death of Satan, pp. 163-194.
- (3) *The Genetic View of Berkeley's Religious Motivation*. G. STANLEY HALL. Pp. 137-162.
- (4) *Fear in Religion*. W. D. WALLIS. Pp. 257-304.
- (5) *The Psychology and Pedagogy of Doubt*. JOSIAH MORSE. Pp. 418-428.
- (6) *The Psychology of Religion*. JAMES B. PRATT. Pp. 383-394.

With the appearance of its fifth volume, *The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education* modified its name and changed its editors. The disappearance of "Educational" and the appearance of "Anthropological and Sociological" indicate sufficiently the change that has taken place in the field covered by the journal.

(1) The first parts of this paper deal in a sketchy way with the several concepts of immortality; with the different theories of the origin of the belief; and with the grounds upon which the belief rests.

The last part, entitled "Present Status of the Belief," is an investigation by means of a *questionnaire* containing no less than thirty questions. It is much easier to draw false than right conclusions from the one hundred and seventy answers which the author received. Of the one hundred and four answers coming from the

professional classes, seventy-five announce a belief in personal immortality. Apparently all these regard the doctrine of Christ's resurrection as "the crowning evidence of a future life." Of the forty-six answers received from high-school pupils only one doubts the reality of an after-life. And of the twenty answers from college students, again only one doubts personal immortality.

The information I have secured upon the belief of college students indicates, what is indeed apparent to any one acquainted with the times, that the *questionnaire* of Mr. Spidle fell into the hands of, or was answered almost exclusively by, persons who believe in immortality, but was not answered by *all* the persons belonging to the classes to whom the *questionnaire* was sent.

(2) The first half of Sparkman's paper deals with the historical development of Satan's forebears from antiquity to modern times. The second half seeks to discover the reasons for the existence of a belief that has taken such a deep hold on human nature. The author proposes to apply to the idea of the devil the psychoanalysis used by Freud for the discovery of psychic disorders. "Using race as a psychological unit, may it not have forgotten many processes analogous to those of the individual? May not its horizon have broadened and its consciousness *in toto* have found certain ideas unpalatable? If so, . . . the devil could be, in Freud's own language regarding the individual, 'the created output in a sublimated manifestation of various thwarted and repressed wishes of which it is no longer conscious.'" In this view the devil has been "an outlet for otherwise nauseating conscious thoughts."

(3) "To explain the philosopher psychologically is one of the chief new duties which our science now owes to the great speculative minds of the past." Berkeley is, according to Dr. Hall, a favorable example for "this new psychoanalysis." In a brief account of the philosopher's life we are shown how by his temperament and education he was tempted to a denial of the reality of matter. "His all-dominant wish was to exalt the cause of faith and reason above, and at the expense of, that of sense." "He would make a great *coup* which should bring consternation to the critics of religion. . . . He would impeach and discredit the most ancient trusted oracles of mankind . . . by showing that matter too was really immaterial, was only a practical postulate on the plane of sense, which must be, in fact, everywhere accepted by an act of faith."

His romantic missionary enterprises and his advocacy of the wonderful properties of tar-water confirm the indications of his

early life, and throw such additional light upon the motivation of his philosophy that no student who would understand its *raison d'être* should omit the reading of *Siris*, during his lifetime the most popular of his works, but now almost forgotten.

(4) The chief purpose of the author seems to be two-fold. First to show that awe and reverence are essential and invariable elements in every true religious consciousness; secondly that the foundation of religion rests in individual as well as in social psychology. Here he opposes the theory of Durkheim according to which religion can be explained only by reference to social consciousness.

The paper reports a large number of experiences from the life of more or less primitive peoples, all of which elicit the same reaction, namely fear.

The author's definition of religion by means of fear, awe and reverence is subject to the criticism which I have offered in several of my writings. His contention that the origin of religion must be sought both in individual and in social psychology appears so nearly self-evident that when it is contradicted, it must be, it seems to me, because of a verbal misunderstanding.

(5) "The thesis of this paper is that doubt and belief are contrary psychical states, that the law of contrast holds between them, and that belief is the inducing or positive state, and doubt the induced or negative state." It is the inculcation in youth of beliefs that are antagonistic to those which experience interpreted by modern knowledge produces, which is the cause of the pathetic state of doubt so common in adolescence. "Doubt is not necessary; it is not a natural heritage of youth;—it is an unhappy state induced by dogmatism and unwise pedagogy."

(6) After a critical discussion of the three sources from which the psychologist of religion obtains his facts (individual experience in autobiographies, letters; answers to definite questions; objective expressions of social religion furnished by history, anthropology, and literature), Pratt passes to the question, What is the proper attitude of the psychologist toward the commonly assumed objective reality of the cause, or causes, of religious experiences? We are told that for its own protection science must act as if there were no interruptions in the sequence of phenomena. The psychologist should content himself with describing the phenomena as he finds them, leaving to others the guess work by which apparent breaks in experience are bridged over, that is, the hypothesis of supernatural interference and the "scientific" hypothesis of unconscious activity and others.

"I cannot help thinking that it would ultimately lead to great disappointment, if not to positive scepticism, if we should sanguinely expect, as I fear many cultured religious people have been led to expect, that the psychological study of religion can demonstrate any of the truths of theology. And equally misleading does it seem to me to suppose, as some leading 'functional' psychologists seem to do, that the psychology of religion can ever so develop as to be in any sense a substitute for philosophy or theology." Psychology "must content itself with a description of human experience, while recognizing that there may be spheres of reality to which these experiences refer and with which they are possibly connected, which yet cannot be investigated by science."

There is not space here for a critical discussion of Professor Pratt's position. I may however be allowed to refer to my treatment of certain aspects of this problem on pages 244-261 of my book *A Psychological Study of Religion; its Origin, Function and Future*.

JAMES H. LEUBA

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

Zeitschrift der Religionspsychologie, 1911. Vol. V.

- (1) *Aufgabe und Methode der Religionspsychologie*. HERMANN BAUKE. Pp. 97-104.
- (2) *Zur Frage nach der transzendental-psychologischen Methode in der Religionswissenschaft*. GEORG WOBBERMIN. Pp. 225-234.
- (3) *Religiöses Erkennen und Erkenntnistheorie*. K. A. BUSCH. Pp. 209-218.
- (4) *Grundsätze und Aufgaben der Religionspsychologie*. ROLAND SCHUTZ. Pp. 245-263.
- (5) *Das religionspsychologische Problem Zinzendorf*. H. LEHMANN. Pp. 327-336.
- (6) *Zur Psychologie des hysterischen Madonnenkultus*. O. PFISTER. Pp. 263-271.

(1) The first of these papers is a criticism of an address by Wobbermin. The second is a retort by the latter.

Bauke defends the so-called "American school of religious psychology" against Wobbermin who finds it too exclusively naturalistic, and who, in order to make it adequate, would complete it by the addition of a "*transzendental-psychologischen Aufgabe mit transzendental-psychologischer Methode*." Bauke holds that the American psychologists have remained true to the methods of a strictly empirical science and believes that the transcendental-psychological

method of Wobbermin does not belong to the psychology of religion, but to theology.

(2) In his answer Wobbermin accuses Bauke of not having understood him. He maintains that that which he means by the phrase which we have quoted does not include a "*spekulativ-metaphysische Bearbeitung psychischer Erscheinungen*;" he does not mean to enter the field of the normative sciences. The psychological analysis of religious experience "from the point of view of our interest in truth (*Wahrheitsinteresse*)" deals with the motives and tendencies which are fundamental to the system of religious thought. The transcendental-psychological analysis is interested not in the religious consciousness of particular individuals in its particular forms, not in the varied individual expressions of religious life, but in the establishment of religious thought as a whole. "That is not a purely empirical investigation, it is an investigation directed by a problem transcendently formulated. Nevertheless, the investigation remains within the field of psychological analysis. It is therefore not normative." Wobbermin rejects the imputation that by his transcendental-psychological procedure he seeks to draw conclusions regarding the objective reality of the object of religious belief. He believes that theology should find help in psychology, but that no help can come to it from empirical psychology unless it be extended by the method he advocates. Alone the transcendental-psychological point of view can produce a body of conclusions useful to theology.

If Wobbermin uses here "transcendental" in the sense of "trans-individual," he is certainly justified in demanding that the psychologists of religion do not neglect that part of the field of religious experience. And if this is the conclusion of the whole matter, Bauke would, I think, offer no objection. But then would not the word "sociological" advantageously replace "transcendental"?

(3) This is one of the many defences of religion against psychology. But as a matter of fact it is not religion such as we find it in history that is successfully defended, but a conception of it which is far from corresponding exactly to the religion of those without whom religion as a social institution would never have existed. Religion is conceived here as concerned with fundamental judgments of worth upon the existent, including scientific knowledge. Religion is therefore very far from expressing a scientific knowledge similar to the knowledge of the natural or of the psychological sciences. It is concerned with value-judgments, not with the establishment of a system of causal connections. Religion moves in the sphere of the

absolute, not in that of the relative. Therefore its object is beyond the reach of science.

The conceptual formulation of religious beliefs is to be considered, we are told, as having simply a symbolic significance; they should be looked upon as poetical forms. When thus considered, the ideas of heaven, of the Kingdom of God, of the Heavenly Father are removed from the reach of psychological science.

Who would deny that the Absolute is outside of the province of psychology? But the religious peoples who have made the historical religions, believed not in an Absolute, but in a personal God or gods and it is only because they believed in the reality of personal gods that religions came into existence. With the Absolute *really conceived as an Absolute*, religions as such have never had anything to do.

(4) This paper considers the sources from which the psychology of religion can draw its material, the task of that science, and its relation to theology.

(5) We have here a part of the polemical discussions aroused by the monograph of Dr. Oskar Pfister, *Die Frömmigkeit des Grafen, L. von Zinzendorf*. In that essay Zinzendorf appears as having "sexualized piety."

(6) This paper reports the psychoanalysis of a neuropathic youth. It is of no particular significance.

JAMES H. LEUBA

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

William James als Religionsphilosoph. K. A. BUSCH. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1911. Pp. vii + 88.

The author of this monograph was a student at the Harvard Divinity School during the year 1909-1910, and there came under James's personal influence,—a fact which probably suggested the writing of the book and seems certainly to have influenced its tone. For though Dr. Busch cannot agree with many of James's conclusions, he shows throughout an intelligent sympathy with them and a real understanding of James's spirit. The work is hardly to be compared with Boutroux's admirable little book on James, yet it does well what it sets out to do, namely to give a systematic presentation of James's philosophy of religion. That there is need for such a work—and not only in Germany but here in America as well—is of course plain to every reader of James. James was no "systematic philosopher" and his views on religious subjects are scattered through most of his works. And for the task of systematization in general

certainly no one is better equipped than a German—especially if he has (as is the case with Dr. Busch) a sympathetic appreciation of the person systematized. Any one wishing an orderly exposition of James's attitude toward religious problems will find it here, duly set forth with nothing of importance omitted and with nothing out of place, all the way from *Religionspsychologie* to the "*Jamesche Metaphysik*."

JAMES B. PRATT

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

The Idea of Feeling in Rousseau's Religious Philosophy. A. C. ARMSTRONG. Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil., 1911, 24, 242-260.

This paper is an altogether admirable exposition of its subject. Its chief interest to the psychologist lies in directing attention to the variety of experiences that may be included in such terms as "feeling" and "heart" when appealed to for decision in questions of religious belief. Thus Rousseau's *sentiment intérieur*, the source of confident assurance, is shown to include logical as well as affective elements, to denote self-consciousness and the intuition of principles and, again, desire, emotion, aspiration and the appreciation of ideal values. Rousseau himself seems to have been prevented by the bent of his genius from having any conception of this variety; he certainly contributes nothing directly to elucidate it. By his emphasis on the affective side of our nature as over against the "analytic understanding" he powerfully influenced not only the constructive philosophy, but also the psychology of feeling and emotion in the eighteenth century, and his observations, particularly his self-revelations, still furnish rich material for psychological study. But he was too little of a systematic thinker and too lacking in scientific interest to solve the problems involved in the movement he inaugurated.

H. N. GARDINER

SMITH COLLEGE

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NOTES AND NEWS

DR. C. E. FERREE, of Bryn Mawr College, is one of the members of the Sub-committee on the Hygiene of the Eye, of the American Medical Association, the object of which is to study the effect of different kinds of lighting systems on the eye, with the purpose of conserving vision. The work done by Dr. Ferree during the past year, under the auspices of this committee, was reported in a paper read by him at the convention of the Illuminating Engineering Society held at Niagara Falls on September 17, and again before the Philadelphia Section of this Society, on October 18.

DR. J. E. W. WALLIN, Director of the Psychological Clinic in the University of Pittsburgh, has been appointed R. B. Mellon Fellow in the division of smoke investigation in the department of industrial research of the university, with the immediate duties of making a preliminary survey of the literature bearing on the psychology of smoke, and of outlining a plan of investigation in this field. Owing to the lack of bibliographies bearing on this topic, he will be pleased to receive statements from any one who has made observations on the mental influences of smoke, or who is in a position to supply references.

THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Association met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences on November 25. The following papers were read: "Difference-Tones and Consonance," by Professor F. Krueger, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Halle-Wittenberg, Kaiser Wilhelm Professor in Columbia University; "The Attempt to Measure Mental Work as a Psycho-Dynamic Process," by Professor Raymond Dodge, of Wesleyan University; "The Psychology of the Earthworm," by Professor Robert M. Yerkes, of Harvard University.

ON November 11, Dr. H. L. Hollingworth, of Columbia University, read a paper on "The Relation of Psychology to Medicine and Law" at a meeting of the Society of Medical Jurisprudence.

THE twenty-first annual meeting of the American Psychological Association will be held at Western Reserve University, Cleveland, on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, December 30 and 31, and January 1.

THE present number of the BULLETIN, dealing especially with social and religious psychology, has been prepared under the editorial care of Professor G. H. Mead.

INDEX OF NAMES

Names of contributors are printed in SMALL CAPITALS, and the page numbers of the contributions in **Full Face Type**. In the case of authors reviewed or summarized the page numbers are in *Italics* and in the case of mention in the notes and book lists they are in Roman Type.

- ABBOTT, E., 68, 313
 Abelson, A. R., 220, 230
 Abramowski, E., 24, 192, 334
 Ach, N., 370
 Acher, R., 274
 Adler, A., 39
 Alexander, G., 178
 Alexander, S., 341, 413
 Allard, 299
 D'Allonnes, G. R., 196
 Alrutz, S., 334
 AMES, E. S., 465
 Anderson, B. M., Jr., 263
 André, E. L., 399
 Angell, J. R., 9, 94, 220, 275, 341
 ANGLIER, R. P., 173, 255
 Ankermann, B., 379
 Anstruther-Thompson, C., 207, 430
 Aptekmann, E., 435
 Armstrong, A. C., 483
 Arps, G. F., 407
 Assagioli, R., 96
 Auerbach, F., 19, 248
 Aveling, F., 334, 484
 Ayres, L. P., 167, 220, 347, 396

 Baade, W., 268
 Baglioni, S., 178
 BAIRD, J. W., 321
 Baker, S., 192
 Baldwin, B. T., 128, 230
 Baldwin, J. M., 93, 208, 263
 Banks, N., 299
 Bárány, K., 178
 Barnholt, S. E., 178
 Barrett, E. B., 93, 413
 Basler, A., 199, 253
 Bateson, W., 115
 Bauer, V., 105
 Bauke, H., 480
 Bawden, H. H., 24
 Bean, C. H., 207
 Becher, E., 19
 Bechterew, W., 347
 Becker, W. H., 153
 Behr, C., 106
 Bell, J. C., 370
 Bell, Julia, 230, 280
 BENTLEY, M., 97, 178, 407
 Benussi, V., 253, 260
 Bergson, H., 19, 93, 354
 Bernard, L. L., 413
 Betz, W., 220, 230, 334, 342
 Binet, A., 9, 167, 168, 192, 334, 358
 BINGHAM, W. V., 40, 41, 208, 347
 Blan, L. B., 396
 Bleuler, E., 169, 274
 Bliss, D. C., 221
 Blondel, A., 214
 Boas, F., 379, 389, 404
 Bobertag, O., 9, 168
 Bock, C. P., 408
 Bode, B. H., 19, 24
 Boden, F., 128
 Bogardus, E. S., 420
 Bohn, G., 288, 289
 BOLTON, T. L., 404
 Boodin, J. E., 342
 BOOK, W. F., 30, 34, 407
 BORING, E. G., 60
 Bosanquet, B., 128, 263
 Botezat, E., 98
 Botti, M., 93
 Boutroux, E., 12
 Bowne, B. P., 279
 Boyce, A. C., 230
 Brandeis, L. D., 396
 Braunhausen, N., 9
 Breed, F. S., 312
 Breitwieser, J. V., 234
 Brett, G. S., 484
 Brewer, J. M., 199
 Bridou, V., 192
 Brill, A. A., 274
 Briot, A., 19
 BROWN, WARNER, 199, 361, 431
 Brown, Wm., 125, 192, 199, 214, 221, 370
 Browne, C. A., 396
 Bruce, H. A., 274
 Brückner, A., 106, 112
 BRUNER, F. G., 380
 BUCHNER, E. F., 1
 Bühler, K., 334
 Burgess, A. F., 299

- BURROW, T., 76, 154, 274
 Busch, A., 153, 196
 Busch, K. A., 480, 482
 Busemann, A., 230, 334, 370
 Bushnell, D. J., Jr., 389
 Busse, A., 94

 Caldecott, A., 192
 CALKINS, M. W., 24, 25, 439
 Calvert, P. P., 299
 CANNON, W. B., 73, 185
 Carpenter, F. W., 288
 CARR, H., 257
 Castle, W. E., 116
 Cattell, J. McK., 96, 370, 396
 Chabrier, 192
 Chambers, W. G., 370
 CHAMBERLAIN, A. F., 95, 473, 477
 Chapin, M. W., 370
 CHASE, H. W., 30, 24
 Chaveau, A., 253
 Chidester, F. E., 288
 Childs, H. G., 168
 Chinaglia, L., 257
 Chojecki, A., 271
 Claparède, E., 36, 192, 334
 Clark, D., 186
 Clarke, H. M., 34, 334
 Cohn, J., 230, 370
 Cohn, M., 19
 COLE, L. W., 84
 Colvin, S. S., 280, 335
 Cook, H. D., 257
 COOLEY, C. H., 441
 Copeland, M., 312
 Coriat, I. H., 193
 Cornetz, V., 299
 Cory, E. N., 299
 Cotlarciuc, N., 19
 Courtis, S. A., 221, 396
 Cowles, R. P., 288
 Craig, W., 312
 Cramaussel, Ed, 39
 CRANE, H. W., 451
 Crawford, D., 186
 Crehore, A. C., 235
 Cruchet, R., 178
 Culler, A. J., 439
 Cummings, B. F., 312
 Curtis, W. C., 289
 Cushman, H. E., 12
 Cutten, C. B., 274

 Dana, C. L., 178
 Da Rocha, F., 389
 Dauber, J., 335, 371
 Davenport, C. B., 116, 396
 Dawson, J., 128, 228
 DAY, L. M., 60
 DEARBORN, G. V. N., 73, 196, 413
 Dearborn, W. F., 360

 Decroly, O., 168
 Degand, J., 168
 DELABARRE, E. B., 409
 DELACROIX, H., 470
 De Sanctis, S., 96, 221, 371
 Descœudres, A., 221, 231
 Desroche, P., 214, 288
 Dessoir, Max, 12, 24, 484
 Deussen, P., 358
 Dewey, J., 19
 Dieffenbacher, J., 230, 370
 D'Istria, F. C., 19
 DODGE, R., 24, 62, 72, 214, 486
 Doflein, F., 288, 289
 Doll, E. A., 360
 Dolson, G. N., 19
 Doncaster, L., 116
 Donley, J. E., 193
 Dorsey, J. O., 207
 DOWNEY, J. E., 62, 181, 248, 342
 Driesch, H., 19
 Drozyński, L., 185
 Drzewina, A., 289
 Dufour, M., 106, 253, 254
 DUNLAP, K., 35, 106, 197, 199, 207, 234, 235
 Dupré, E., 123, 353
 Durkheim, E., 203

 Eastman, C. A., 389
 Edridge-Green, F. W., 112
 Elliot, H. S. R., 248
 Ellis, H., 40
 Ellwood, C. A., 461
 Elsenhaus, T., 371, 439
 Emerson, H., 396
 Enslin, E., 299
 Erler, O., 231
 Escherich, K. v., 299
 Euken, R., 93
 Eulenburg, A., 93
 Ewald, J. R., 123
 Exner, S., 371

 Fay, E. W., 353
 Feis, O., 371
 FERNALD, G. G., 78
 Fernald, G. M., 221
 Fernberger, S. W., 440
 FERREE, C. E., 70, 106, 107, 440, 486
 Feuchtwanger, A., 335, 371
 Fichte, J. C., 94
 Field, G. C., 413
 Fischer, A., 335, 371
 FISCHER, S. C., 321
 Fite, W., 24
 Fletcher, J. M., 408
 Flournoy, Th., 276
 Forbes, A., 154, 186
 Forsyth, C. H., 231
 FOSTER, W. S., 321, 335

- Foucault, M., 335
 Foy, W., 379
 Franchini, G., 196
 Francia, G., 192
 Franken, A., 19, 268
 FRANZ, S. I., 47, 89, 98, 145, 153, 423
 Frazer, J. G., 431
 FREEMAN, F. N., 215, 221, 347
 Freire-Marreco, B., 389
 Freud, Sig., 40, 208, 274
 Frey, H., 123
 Frey, M. v., 178, 257
 Friedländer, A., 178
 Friedmann, M., 93, 192
 Frink, H. W., 274
 Frisch, K. v., 312
 Fuchs, F., 299
 Fursac, J. R. de, 192

 Gallinger, A., 279
 GAMBLE, E. A. McC., 86
 Gantt, H. L., 396
 GARDINER, H. N., 186, 354, 483
 Gault, R. H., 408
 Gaultier, P., 19
 Geiger, M., 192
 Geissler, L. R., 36, 360
 Giesswein, 353
 Gifford, E. G., 221
 Gilby, W. H., 221, 231
 Gildmeister, M., 199
 Gillett, M. S., 263
 Girault, A. A., 299
 Givens, A. J., 280
 Glaser, O. C., 371
 Glover, J., 353
 Glueck, B., 453
 GODDARD, H. H., 9, 79, 81, 168, 221, 396, 407
 Goebel, 123
 GOLDENWEISER, A. A., 373, 454
 Goldmark, J., 396
 Goodell, M. S., 186
 GORDON, KATE, 430
 GORE, W. C., 337
 Göring, H., 153
 Graebner, F., 379
 Grassi, I., 196, 234
 Gregor, A., 154
 Grinnell, G. B., 389
 Groos, K., 19
 Gulick, L. H., 221
 Günther, F., 234
 Gutzmann, H., 353

 Hack, V., 407
 HAGGERTY, M. E., 52, 280, 312
 Haines, T. H., 440
 Hall, G. S., 95, 477
 Hamilton, G. V., 9
 Hardy, A. A., 299

 Hargitt, C. W., 289, 312
 Harper, E. H., 289
 Hart, B., 24, 25, 231
 Hartenberg, P., 207
 Haseman, J. D., 289
 Haycraft, J. B., 112
 Hayes, E. C., 379, 396
 HAYES, S. P., 95, 112, 116
 Healy, W., 221, 453
 Heindl, R., 268
 Heller, T., 439
 Henderson, E. N., 192, 335
 HENMON, V. A. C., 85, 232, 339
 Hennig, R., 279
 Henry, C., 19, 214, 335
 Henry, M. C., 94
 Hermann, L., 123, 353
 Herms, W. B., 299
 Heron, D., 231
 HERRICK, C. J., 50
 Herrick, F. H., 312
 Herrick, G. W., 299
 Hertz, A. F., 179
 Heymans, G., 371
 Hill, D. S., 24
 Hill, Mrs. D. S., 24
 Hill, H. F., 221
 Hill, M. D., 299
 Hinds, W. E., 299
 Hinrichsen, O., 371
 Hirschel, G., 423
 Hoch, A., 169
 Hocking, W. E., 279, 472
 Hodge, F. A., 207
 Höffding, H., 439
 Hofmann, F. B., 260
 Hoge, M. A., 312
 HOLLINGWORTH, H. L., 9, 78, 204, 248, 335, 396, 408, 420, 423, 424, 486
 Holmes, A., 208
 HOLMES, S. J., 93, 289, 314, 318
 HOLT, E. B., 276
 Hornbostel, E. v., 123
 Horne, H. H., 128, 413
 Horner, 116
 Hrdlička, A., 407
 Huber, E., 335, 371
 HUEY, E. B., 63, 95, 160, 168, 221
 Hunter, W. S., 312
 Hurwitz, S. H., 289
 Huther, A., 371

 Isserlin, M., 423

 Jacobson, E., 24, 34, 196, 214, 335, 342, 423
 Jacoby, G. W., 271
 Jaensch, E. R., 254
 James, W., 279
 Janet, P., 24
 Jastrow, J., 25, 359, 371

- Jesinghaus, C., 335, 342
 Jessup, W. A., 408
 Joachim, H. H., 192
 Johnson, G. H., 396
 JOHNSON, H. M., 59, 271, 280
 Johnston, C. H., 207
 Johnston, K. L., 168
 JONES, E., 40, 75, 192, 271, 274, 407
 Jones, E. E. C., 342
 Jones, R., 371
 Jones, W. F., 371
 Josefowici, U., 371
 Joseph, H. W. B., 19
 Joteyko, J., 335
 JUDD, C. H., 24, 51
 Jung, C. G., 40

 Kafka, G., 30
 Kakise, H., 335
 Kalischer, O., 98
 Kallen, H. M., 263
 KARLSON, K. J., 321
 Katz, D., 106
 Katzaroff, D., 335
 Katzenstein, J., 353
 Kemmerich, M., 407, 468
 Kennedy, R. F., 179
 Kent, G. H., 154, 335
 Kerschensteiner, G., 371
 Keyes, C. H., 396
 Keyser, C. J., 342, 371
 Kiernan, J. G., 396
 Kiesow, F., 179
 Kilian, K., 154
 King, I., 263, 359
 Kirkpatrick, E. A., 221, 440
 Klages, L., 371
 Klein, A., 342
 Klemm, O., 12
 Klepper, G., 154
 Knab, F., 299
 Koffka, K., 335
 Kohnstamm, O., 413
 Köllner, H., 116
 Kostyleff, N., 9, 274, 413
 Kroeber, A. L., 379
 Kronfeld, A., 274
 Krueger, F., 486
 Kuhlmann, F., 168, 484
 Kunz, M., 179

 Ladd, G. T., 9, 19, 239
 Landry, E., 199
 LANGFELD, H. S., 99, 242, 275, 335, 423
 Lasareff, P., 214
 Lawrence, I., 168
 Lee, V., 207, 430
 Lefevre, G., 289
 Lehmann, H., 480
 Lelande, A., 35
 LeRoy, B., 40

 Leschke, E., 186, 420
 LEUBA, J. H., 439, 472, 473, 476, 477
 Levi, A., 207
 Lévy-Bruhl, L., 12
 Levy-Suhl, M., 24, 335, 371
 Lewis, E. O., 260
 Ley, 335
 Liebermann, M. E., 116
 Liebermann, P. v., 106, 116
 Lipmann, O., 231, 268, 269, 335, 371, 372
 Lloyd, A. H., 342
 Lobsien, M., 231, 335, 372
 Loeb, J., 312, 358
 Loeb, S., 106, 335
 LOUGH, J. E., 87
 Lovejoy, A. O., 19
 Lovell, J. H., 299
 Low, A. M., 399
 Lowsley, O. S., 415
 Lozinski, P., 299
 Luckiesh, M., 106
 Ludemann, H., 263
 Lüdtke, F., 196
 Lund, E. J., 299
 LYON, D. O., 86

 MacDougall, R., 271, 413
 Mach, E., 98
 Mackenzie, I. S., 19
 Mackenzie, W. L., 24
 MacVannel, J. A., 128
 Máday, S. v., 312
 MAGNUSSON, C. E., 71
 Maloney, W. J., 179, 221
 Mampell, H., 254
 Marage, M., 353
 Marbe, K., 101, 359
 Margis, P., 9, 221, 372
 Marie, A., 234, 235
 MARSHALL, H. R., 49
 MARTIN, L. J., 9, 61, 208, 335, 439
 Martius, G., 20
 Marvin, W. T., 221, 484
 Marx, E., 116
 MAST, S. O., 56, 289
 Matula, J., 289
 Maugé, F., 263
 McCabe, J., 24
 McClendon, J. F., 289
 McComas, H. C., 196
 McDermott, F. A., 299
 McDonald, J. B., 221
 McDougall, W., 93, 254, 360
 McDunnough, J., 299
 McEwen, J. B., 484
 McGilvary, E. B., 20, 24
 Mead, G. H., 486
 Meara, F. S., 235
 Medeiros-e-Albuquerque, 181
 Meinong, A., 263
 Meissner, S. R. de, 484

- Menzerath, 335
 Metalnikow, S., 289
 Meumann, E., 9, 168, 221, 336, 372
 Meunier, P., 40
 MEYER, A., 89, 129, 208
 Meyer, E. A., 353
 Meyer, H., 34
 Meyer, J., 353
 Meyerson, E., 207
 Michaelis, C., 35
 Michotte, A., 9
 Miller, D. S., 20, 24
 MINER, J. B., 222
 Minkowski, E., 98
 Minor, L., 179
 Mitchell, A., 20
 Mitchell, C., 24
 Mitchell, J. F., 179
 Moede, W., 336, 342
 Moll, A., 358
 Monnet, R., 254
 Moore, T. V., 34
 Morgan, C. L., 439
 Morse, J., 477
 Morselli, E., 96
 Mosiman, E., 358, 469
 Moulinier, 178
 Mount, G. H., 208
 Muench, W., 372
 Müller, G. E., 336
 Müller-Freienfels, R., 24
 MUNSELL, A. H., 68
 Münsterberg, H., 25, 95, 221, 372
 MURRAY, E., 64
 Myers, C. S., 9, 181, 221, 242

 Nachmann, L., 234, 235
 Näcke, P., 347
 Nathan, E. W., 154
 Nathan, M., 123, 353
 Neil, T. F., 94
 Nepalleck, R., 274
 Neumann, A., 179
 Norsworthy, N., 231

 Odum, H. W., 389
 Oehler, R., 94
 Oesterreich, K., 20, 25, 30
 Offner, M., 336
 OGDEN, R. M., 40, 116, 200, 342
 Okabe, T., 34
 Oppenheim, H., 179
 Oppenheim, R., 269
 Ordahl, L. E., 25, 336
 O'Shea, M. V., 306
 OVERSTREET, H. A., 13

 PACHEU, J., 468, 469, 470
 Palmer, G. H., 413
 Panconcelli-Calzia, G., 353
 PARKER, G. H., 55, 289, 312

 Parrott, R. J., 300
 Parshley, H. M., 289
 Partridge, G. E., 279
 Patini, E., 25, 289
 Patterson, T. L., 300
 Pauli, R., 199
 Paz, D. de la, 185
 Pear, T. H., 123
 Pearce, H. J., 40
 PEARSE, A. S., 281
 Pearson, H. C., 221
 Pearson, K., 221, 231
 Pérez, J., 300
 Perrier, L., 207
 PERRIN, F. A. C., 61
 Perry, R. B., 264
 Peters, W., 336, 359
 PETERSON, J., 65
 Pfenninger, W., 435
 Pfister, O., 480
 Pfordten, O. v. d., 264
 Picavet, F., 472
 Pick, A., 112
 Pielke, W., 353
 PIERCE, A. H., 179
 Piéron, H., 10, 260, 289, 336, 359
 Pigeon, L., 254
 Pike, F. H., 415
 Pikler, J., 25
 Pilcher, V. D., 415
 PILLSBURY, W. B., 9, 193, 221, 280, 413
 Pilotti, G., 178
 Pintner, R., 408
 Plaut, F., 153
 POFFENBERGER, A. T., Jr., 490, 439
 Poirot, J., 353
 Pollak, H. W., 353
 Ponzio, M., 235, 254, 257, 260
 Poppelreuter, W., 254
 Pouget, R. J., 255
 Pradines, M., 413
 Prager, J. J., 196
 Prandtl, A., 186
 PRATT, J. B., 472, 477, 482
 Prince, M., 25, 40, 193, 359
 Prowazek, S. v., 289
 Prüm, E., 9
 Punnett, R. C., 116
 Putnam, J. J., 193, 274
 Pyle, W. H., 248, 336

 Quick, O. C., 264

 Raimann, E., 423
 RALL, E. E., 88
 Rand, B., 248
 Rand, M. G., 106
 Rank, O., 40, 208, 274
 Ranschburg, P., 154, 336
 Read, C., 342
 Read, M. S., 360

- Reese, A. M., 312
 Reeves, P., 408
 Regnault, F., 254
 Rehmke, J., 192
 Rehwoldt, F., 186
 Reichel, H., 269
 Reid, G. A., 372
 Reimer, W., 214
 Renouvier, C., 484
 Révész, G., 106
 Rey, J., 214
 Ribot, Th., 25
 Rice, D. E., 207
 Richards, R. L., 453
 Richardson, W. W., 453
 Rickert, H., 264
 Rignano, E., 196, 248
 RILEY, I. W., 10
 Ritter, C., 420
 Rivers, W. H. R., 379
 Robinson, V., 358, 423
 Rockwell, R. B., 312
 Rosanoff, A. J., 154
 Roubaud, E., 300
 Roustau, D., 93
 Rowe, E. C., 413
 ROWLAND, E. H., 80
 Royce, J., 93
 Rubinstein, M., 264
 Rubitsek, A., 40
 RUCKMICH, C. A., 247, 321
 RUEDIGER, W. C., 40, 46, 72, 423
 Russell, B., 342
 Russell, J. E., 264

 Sachs, H., 208
 Safford, F. H., 214
 Salisbury, 423
 Sander, P., 123
 Sanford, E. C., 280
 Santschi, F., 300
 SAPIR, E., 380, 454
 Sargent, W., 347
 Sasscer, E. R., 300
 Schaeffer, A. A., 312
 Schaub, A. de V., 336
 Schiller, F. C. S., 207
 Schlegel, E., 20
 Schmid, B., 289
 Schmidt, B. A., 260
 Schneider, S., 106
 Schnidtmann, M., 154
 Schönberg, A., 98
 Schramm, F., 269
 Schubotz, F., 254, 260
 Schuster, E., 231
 Schutz, R., 480
 Schwartzkopf, 20
 SCOTT, W. D., 93, 269, 372, 396, 429
 Scripture, E. W., 484
 SEASHORE, C. E., 9, 47, 168, 221, 235

 Selz, O., 372
 Severin, H. C., 300
 Severin, H. H. P., 300
 Shambaugh, G. E., 123
 SHEPARD, J. F., 181
 SHEPARD, W. T., 53, 313
 Sherrington, C. S., 415
 Short, 423
 Sichler, A., 20
 Sidis, B., 36, 40, 192
 Siebrand, 179
 Simon, Th., 9, 167, 168, 358
 Singer, E. A., Jr., 10, 20
 Sisson, E. O., 372
 Sivén, V. O., 106
 Skinner, A., 390
 Sleight, W. G., 336
 Slonaker, J. R., 313
 Smith, A. G., 222
 Smith, N. K., 40
 Snyder, J. C., 336
 Sokolowsky, R., 353
 Sollmann, T., 415
 SOUTHARD, E. E., 91
 Sowton, S. C. M., 415
 Sparkman, C. F., 477
 Spaulding, E. G., 40
 Spearman, C., 231
 Spidle, S., 477
 Starbuck, E. D., 359
 STARCH, D., 83, 254, 280, 336, 347
 Steele, A. G., 222
 Stăfănescu-Goangă, F., 186
 Stefanini, A., 353
 Stekel, W., 40, 453
 Stern, C., 269
 Stern, W., 94, 231, 269, 396
 Sternberg, W., 179
 STEVENS, H. C., 69
 Stigler, R., 106
 Stocking, R. J., 312
 Stocks, J. L., 413
 Stout, G. F., 20
 STRATTON, G. M., 199, 249, 254, 465
 Strayer, G. D., 222, 396
 STRONG, E. K., JR., 66, 124, 429
 Strong, R. M., 313
 Stumpf, C., 123, 200, 207, 248, 380
 Sumner, F. B., 313
 Super, C. W., 353
 Swanton, J. R., 207, 390
 Swift, W. B., 313
 Swinton, A. A. C., 106
 Symes, W. L., 423
 Szymanski, J. S., 98, 300

 Tarr, W. D., 124
 Talayrach, I., 353
 Talbot, M., 397
 Tassy, E., 193
 Tawney, G. A., 10, 25

- Terman, L. M., 168
 Teslar, J. S. van, 274
 Thilly, F., 40
 Thompson, M. E., 347
 Thorndike, E. L., 10, 40, 222, 318, 397, 420
 Thurnwald, R., 380
 Tichý, G., 260
 Titchener, E. B., 25, 30, 36, 193, 440
 Todd, J. W., 439
 Toulouse, E., 10, 424
 Town, C. H., 168
 Trömmner, E., 358
 Truc, G., 473
 Truschel, 255
 Tucker, A. W., 106
 Tufts, J. H., 461
 TURNER, C. H., 290, 300
 Turner, W. F., 299
 Úlehla, V., 289
 URBAN, F. M., 125, 179, 209, 214, 215, 245
 URBAN, W. M., 260, 280
 Urbantschitsch, V., 123, 353
 Urtin, H., 93
 Valentine, C. W., 260
 Van Gennep, A., 347
 Van Sickle, J., 397
 Varendonck, J., 269
 Veley, V. H., 423
 Verain, L., 106
 Villa, G., 96
 Vold, J. M., 10, 40, 248
 Vos, H. B. L., 269
 Wager, H., 289
 Waite, H., 222, 231
 Walker, C., 372
 Walker, H., 25
 WALLIN, J. E. W., 81, 94, 154, 168, 208, 390, 397, 486
 Wallis, W. D., 477
 Warfield, B. B., 476
 Warren, E. R., 313
 WARREN, H. C., 35, 84, 347
 WASHBURN, M. F., 54, 67, 186, 300, 313, 359, 370, 438
 Wasteney, H., 312
 Waterman, G., 40
 Watson, J., 439
 WATSON, J. B., 9, 91, 128, 222
 Watson, W., 106
 Watt, H. J., 193
 Weber, E., 420
 WEIDENSALL, J., 57
 Weiss, A. P., 222
 Weiss, O., 353
 WELD, H. P., 236, 407
 WELLS, F. L., 154, 186, 222, 336, 416, 435
 WELLS, G. R., 68, 127, 360
 Wethlo, F., 353
 Weyer, E. M., 25
 Wharton, W. P., 372
 Wheeler, W. M., 300
 Whetham, C. D., 397
 Whetham, W. C. D., 397
 WHIPPLE, G. M., 154, 168, 264, 280, 360
 Whitley, M. T., 231, 372
 WILLIAMS, T. A., 76, 193
 Willis, C. A., 179, 215
 Wilm, E. C., 408
 Wilson, C. M., 347
 Winch, W. H., 222, 321, 336, 372, 397, 420
 Wingfield, H., 274
 Wirth, W., 128, 215, 245
 Witherspoon, J., 248
 Wobbermin, G., 480
 Wodsedalek, J. E., 300
 Woods, F. A., 397
 WOODWORTH, R. S., 9, 95, 106, 222, 231, 239, 336, 380, 397
 WOOLEY, H. T., 82
 Wundt, W., 208, 360, 380, 484
 YERKES, R. M., 9, 10, 20, 30, 50, 54, 106, 222, 314, 486
 YOAKUM, C. S., 413
 Yule, G. U., 231
 Yung, E., 290
 Zergiebel, M., 372
 Ziehen, T., 95, 179

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- Abstracts of Papers, 47
 Action, Reflex, 413
 Advertising, Psychology of, 124, 204
 Aesthetics, 430
 Affective Phenomena, (Experimental), 181; (Descriptive and Theoretical), 186
 Animal Intelligence, 314, 318
 Anthropology, 431
 Apparatus, 235, 247
 Applied Psychology, 124, 204, 264, 429
 Association Experiment, 435
 Associations, Meetings of, 41, 46
 Attention and Interest, 193
 Auditory Space, 254
 Auditory Stimuli, Reaction to, 127

 Bibliographical, 35
 Binet Scale of Tests, Present Status of, 160

 Consciousness and the Unconscious, 20, 154
 Correction, 438
 Correlations, 222
 Criminal Psychology, 451
 Cutaneous Senses, 173

 Dementia Præcox, 169
 Dreams, 36
 Drug Action, Psychological Aspects of, 420

 Efficiency, Individual and Group, 390
 Experimental Psychology, 242

 Fatigue, 416
 Folk-Psychology, 373

 Graphic Functions, 342

 Hearing, 116
 Higher Mental Processes, Analyses of, 30; (Experimental), 321; (Theory), 337
 Historical Contributions, 10

 Illusions, Space, 257
 Imagination, 321
 Individual Psychology, 390, 424
 Interest, Attention and, 193
 Invertebrates, Behavior of, 281, 290

 James, W., The Philosophy of, 276

 Kinæsthetic Senses, 173
 Kinæsthetic Space, 255

 Laughter, 354
 Learning, 321

 Measurements, Mental, 125
 Measurement Methods, Psychophysical, 209
 Meetings, Reports of, 41, 46, 236
 Memory, 321, 337
 Mental Classes, 361
 Mental Processes, Higher, 30, 321, 337
 Mentation, Conscious and Unconscious from Psychoanalytic Viewpoint, 154
 Mind and Body, 13
 Motor Consciousness, 409
 Music, Origins of, 200

 Pathopsychology, 129
 Physiological Psychology, 239
 Primitive Races, 380, 400
 Proceedings of Meetings, 41, 46, 236
 Psychological Progress, 1
 Psychology, Applied, 124, 204, 264, 429; Comparative, 281, 290, 300, 314, 318, 404; Criminal, 451; Experimental, 242; Folk, 373; Individual, 390, 424; Modern, Angell's Chapters from, 275; National and Race, 380, 397, 400; Physiological, 239; Progress of, 1; Religious, 465-483; Social, 441, 454
 Psychopathology, 129; Experimental, 145
 Psychophysics, 209, 245
 Psychotherapy, 271


 Reaction Times, 127, 232
 Reflex Action, 413
 Religion, Psychology of, 465
 Report, Psychology of, 264
 Reports of Meetings, 41, 46, 236
 Rhythm, Time and, 197

 Self in Recent Psychology, 25
 Sensation (General), 97
 Senses, Miscellaneous, 173
 Social Psychology, 441; 454-465
 Space, Auditory, 254; Illusions, 257; Tactual and Kinæsthetic, 255; Visual, 249
 Suggestion, 269
 Synæsthesia, 179

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

495

- Tactual Space, 255
- Terminology, 35
- Testimony, Psychology of, 264
- Tests, 160, 215
- Thought Processes, 30
- Time and Rhythm, 197
- Values, 260
- Vertebrates, Behavior of, 300
- Vision, Color Defects, 112; General Phenomena, 99; Peripheral, Foveal, etc., 107
- Visual Space, 249
- Visual Stimuli, Reaction to, 127
- Vocal Functions, 347
- Volition, 409



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CONTENTS

Valuation as a Social Process: C. H. COOLEY, 441.

General Reviews and Summaries:

Criminal Psychology: H. W. CRANE, 451.

Special Reviews:

Anthropology (Goldenweiser): E. SAPIR, 454. *Social Psychology* (Ellwood): J. H. TUFTS, 461. *Religious Psychology* (Stratton): E. S. AMES, 465; (Kemmerich, Mosiman): J. PACHEU, 468; (Pacheu): H. DELACROIX, 470; (Hocking): J. B. PRATT, 472; (Picavet, Truc): J. H. LEUBA, 472; (Leuba): A. F. CHAMBERLAIN, 473; (Warfield): J. H. LEUBA, 476; (Current Religious Periodicals): J. H. LEUBA, 477; (Busch): J. B. PRATT, 482; (Armstrong): H. N. GARDINER, 483.

Books Received, 484 and 485; *Notes and News*, 486; *Indexes*, 487.

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